Gause v. Medical Business Consultants, Inc.
8:18-cv-01726
M.D. Fla.Dec 9, 2019Background
- Plaintiff Brandon Gause received a one-page collection letter from Medical Business Consultants, Inc. (MBC) seeking payment of a medical debt and enclosing FDCPA validation language; the letter urged the recipient to "CONTACT US IMMEDIATELY" and stated MBC "report[s] to multiple Credit Bureaus bi weekly."
- Gause filed a putative class action (~1,000 individuals) alleging violations of the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act (FCCPA) §559.72(9) and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) §§1692g(b), 1692e, and 1692f; he also sought declaratory and injunctive relief.
- MBC moved to dismiss for lack of Article III standing under Spokeo and, alternatively, for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c).
- The court applied the Spokeo framework (substantive vs. procedural statutory rights; history and Congress's judgment) to the FDCPA/FCCPA claims.
- Rulings: standing and merits survive for FCCPA §559.72(9) (as to the "assume valid if you don't contact immediately" language) and for FDCPA §1692e (deceptive/false practices) but not for FDCPA §1692g(b) (overshadowing) or the declaratory/injunctive relief; FDCPA §1692f (unfair means) was dismissed for failing to plead conduct distinct from the §1692e allegations.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Article III standing (injury-in-fact) | Statutory violations of FCCPA/FDCPA inflict concrete or at least a real risk of harm to statutorily protected interests | No concrete injury; Spokeo requires more than a bare statutory violation | Court: standing exists for substantive-right claims (FCCPA §559.72(9) and FDCPA §§1692e/1692f) but not for the procedural §1692g(b) claim or for declaratory/injunctive relief (no plausible future injury alleged) |
| FCCPA §559.72(9) — asserted nonexistent legal right ("assume" language; credit-reporting threat) | Letter assumed debt valid before 30‑day validation period and implicitly threatened reporting, so it asserted a non‑existent legal right | "Immediately" is mere emphasis; reporting to credit bureaus is allowed before 30 days | Court: claim plausibly alleges a §559.72(9) violation as to the "assume"/"immediately" language; claim based on reporting statement dismissed because reporting before 30 days is permitted |
| FDCPA §1692e — false, deceptive, or misleading representations (incl. implicit threat to report) | Letter created false urgency and deceptive threat to report to credit bureaus to induce payment | Statements about reporting and credit impact are factual, not threats; not deceptive | Court: allegations, accepted as true, plausibly state §1692e claims; factual disputes (intent to report; how an ordinary consumer would read the letter) preclude judgment on the pleadings |
| FDCPA §1692f — unfair or unconscionable means | Same letter conduct also amounted to unfair/unconscionable collection practices | §1692f cannot be premised on the same conduct alleged under other FDCPA provisions | Court: §1692f claim dismissed because plaintiff failed to plead distinct misconduct beyond the §1692e allegations |
Key Cases Cited
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (U.S. 2016) (Article III concreteness test for statutory violations; distinguish procedural vs substantive rights)
- Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (U.S. 1982) (statutory creation of legal rights can supply injury‑in‑fact)
- Church v. Accretive Health, Inc., [citation="654 F. App'x 990"] (11th Cir. 2016) (FDCPA §1692g(a) disclosures as a substantive information right conferring standing)
- Nicklaw v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 839 F.3d 998 (11th Cir. 2016) (procedural statutory breach without material risk of harm fails Spokeo standing)
- Perry v. Cable News Network, Inc., 854 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 2017) (statutory privacy violation under VPPA is substantive and confers standing)
- Cliff v. Payco Gen. Am. Credits, Inc., 363 F.3d 1113 (11th Cir. 2004) (use other statutes to define the legal rights referenced in FCCPA §559.72)
- LeBlanc v. Unifund CCR Partners, 601 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2010) (purpose of FCCPA and its scope)
- Jeter v. Credit Bureau of Greater Atlanta, 760 F.2d 1168 (11th Cir. 1985) (least‑sophisticated‑consumer standard for FDCPA §1692e)
