Gary McNeal v. City of Blue Ash, Ohio, 117 F.4th 887

Gary McNeal, a 61-year-old former police officer with 33 years of experience (17 at Blue Ash), was terminated in 2018 and was the oldest officer in the department.
After new leadership in 2015 and 2017 (Noel as chief), McNeal faced increased discipline and scrutiny for a series of minor policy infractions.
Key incidents included a controversial and allegedly demeaning traffic study assignment, frequent discipline for minor violations, and an investigation culminating in his termination for policy violations and alleged untruthfulness.
McNeal challenged his termination as age discrimination and also brought a hostile work environment claim, alongside claims for retaliation and racial discrimination, though only the age claims were preserved on appeal.
The district court granted summary judgment for the City and officials, finding insufficient evidence on either the age-discrimination or hostile environment claims. McNeal appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Age discriminatory termination under ADEA	McNeal claims age was the but-for reason for his firing; younger officers were treated more favorably.	Defendants contend termination was due to McNeal's misconduct, especially untruthfulness, not age.	Court affirmed summary judgment for defendants; McNeal failed to show age was the but-for cause.
Hostile work environment under ADEA	McNeal claims pattern of humiliation and discipline created a hostile environment, focused on his age.	City argues that incidents were either justifiable discipline or discrete acts, not actionable as a hostile environment.	Court reversed summary judgment; enough evidence for jury to decide if age-based hostility existed.
Use of workplace discipline as evidence of harassment	Repetitive discipline for minor offenses was weaponized to harass older officers.	Each discipline was a discrete, unrelated act, not contributing to a climate of age-based hostility.	Court held such acts could collectively support a hostile-work-environment claim, per Supreme Court precedent.
Distinction between discrete acts and hostile environment claims	Even individually actionable incidents formed part of an ongoing hostile atmosphere.	Discrete acts cannot be used as evidence of a hostile work environment.	Court clarified that overlapping harms can be considered; a single act may support both types of claims if it contributes to an ongoing hostile environment.

Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (establishes the "but-for" causation standard for ADEA discrimination claims)
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (lays out burden-shifting framework for employment discrimination claims)
National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002) (distinguishes between discrete actionable acts and the cumulative nature of hostile environment claims)
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (defines hostile work environment for purposes of civil rights employment claims)
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (explains standard for "severe or pervasive" harassment required for hostile environment)
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) (articulates totality-of-the-circumstances approach for hostile environment claims)
St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993) (discusses pretext in discrimination claims)
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) (defines adverse employment action and vicarious liability)
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (requires government disclosure of impeaching evidence, affecting credibility of police officers)
Green v. Brennan, 578 U.S. 547 (2016) (explains timing and substance of hostile-environment claims)
Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346 (2024) (lowers the threshold for adverse employment action; does not require significant harm)