Gary Hanks v. State of Indiana, 2017 Ind. App. LEXIS 124

Background

In 2000 Gary Hanks was charged with one Class A and four Class C child-molesting felonies; the State’s proof was strong and Hanks had made inculpatory statements in a recorded interview.
Hanks’s public defender, Christopher Sturgeon, notified him of a State plea recommending the presumptive 30‑year sentence in exchange for pleading to the Class A count and dismissing the Class C counts; Hanks did not accept that offer.
The State later offered an open plea to the Class A count (dismissal of the Cs) leaving the trial judge discretion to impose between 20 and 50 years; Hanks accepted the open plea and pleaded guilty.
Judge Donahue (the sentencing judge) had a reputation — by his own account — for imposing maximum sentences in sex‑offender open‑plea cases and disfavoring blind/open pleas; Sturgeon testified he did not know of those practices.
At sentencing Judge Donahue imposed the 50‑year maximum; Hanks did not appeal. Years later Hanks sought post‑conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance (failure to advise of the judge’s practices) and that his plea was not knowing/voluntary because he lacked that information.
The post‑conviction court denied relief without deciding voluntariness; the Court of Appeals affirms ineffective‑assistance denial but remands for a ruling on voluntariness.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Hanks)	Defendant's Argument (State/Sturgeon)	Held
Whether counsel’s failure to advise Hanks of the local judge’s sentencing practices in sex‑offender open pleas constituted constitutionally deficient performance	Sturgeon’s ignorance of Judge Donahue’s practices meant Hanks was not properly advised; had Hanks known, he would have accepted the 30‑year offer	No firm rule requires local counsel to inform a client of a judge’s idiosyncratic sentencing habits; no evidence that local practice required such knowledge	Denied: Hanks failed to show counsel’s omission fell below prevailing professional norms in Clark County in 2001; ineffective‑assistance claim fails
Whether Hanks’s guilty plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary given the omission about the judge’s practices	The omission misled or improperly induced Hanks to accept the open plea believing he might get <30 years	State treated voluntariness as tied to ineffective assistance and did not separately brief it below	Remanded: trial court did not decide voluntariness; must determine whether omission rendered the plea involuntary
Whether a failure to advise (omission) is distinguishable from affirmative bad advice for Sixth Amendment purposes	An omission that affects a defendant’s plea decision can be constitutionally deficient	The distinction is not dispositive; context matters and not all omissions are deficient	Clarified: omission can be constitutionally significant (Padilla, Frye), but here facts did not meet the standard for deficiency
Proper standard to judge counsel’s duty to know local judges’ practices	Hanks: ABA guidance and defense duties require familiarity with local sentencing norms	Court/State: national standards are guides; local variation matters — must show strong evidence that knowledge was a prevailing professional norm locally	Court: performance judged by prevailing professional norms; Hanks failed to show Clark County norm required knowledge of Donahue’s practices

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes two‑prong ineffective assistance test)
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (counsel must inform client of deportation risk from plea; omission can be deficient)
Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (counsel must communicate plea offers; failure to do so can be constitutionally deficient)
Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (remedies where ineffective counsel in plea bargaining leads to worse outcome)
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (Strickland applied to plea negotiations)
Bethea v. State, 983 N.E.2d 1134 (Indiana standard on burden in post‑conviction appeals)