Garrus v. Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 694 F.3d 394

Garrus, a Pennsylvania state inmate, sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. §2254 (AEDPA).
He was convicted in 2001 of voluntary manslaughter; the sentencing court imposed a 25-to-50 year term under Pennsylvania’s three-strikes law, §9714.
The court’s enhancement relied on a judicial finding that Garrus had burglarized an occupied building, contrary to his plea which established second-degree burglary for an unoccupied structure.
State courts upheld the sentence, and Garrus’s PCRA petition seeking relief under Apprendi was denied; the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied further review.
The district court denied relief; on appeal, Garrus challenged the 1997 burglary finding as a violation of Apprendi’s jury-trial and reasonable-doubt requirements; the Third Circuit granted a certificate of appealability on that issue.
The court reviews de novo AEDPA standards to determine whether the state court’s ruling was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Apprendi’s prior-conviction exception was applied unreasonably.	Garrus contends the state court allowed a judicial factfinding contradicting a prior conviction.	Commonwealth argues the prior-conviction exception is broad and reasonable under AEDPA.	Yes; state court unreasonably applied Apprendi.
Whether Shepard undermines the state court’s reasoning.	Garrus argues Shepard limits use of police reports to determine prior-violence status.	Commonwealth contends Shepard supports the state court’s approach.	Shepard does not validate the state court’s reasoning.
Whether Almendarez-Torres remains viable as the recidivism exception in this context.	Garrus asserts Almendarez-Torres supports judicial finding of prior-violence status.	Commonwealth relies on Almendarez-Torres as controlling for recidivism.	Yes to objective reasonable application; however, the court concludes the specific application here was unreasonable under Apprendi.
Whether AEDPA deference requires upholding the state court’s decision.	Garrus argues the state court’s ruling was unreasonable under AEDPA’s deferential standard.	Commonwealth asserts the state court reasonably applied Supreme Court precedent.	No; the state court’s ruling was an unreasonable application, warranting relief.

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases penalty must be jury-tried)
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998) (recidivism exception allowing prior-conviction evidence to enhance sentence)
Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999) (prior-conviction basis for enhancement must be reliably established)
Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (police reports cannot be used to expand the meaning of the prior conviction)
Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007) (sentencing discretion constrained by range set by legislature)
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011) (AEDPA deference standards; 'unreasonable application' strictness)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (definition of unreasonable application under AEDPA)
Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 934 (2007) (general AEDPA framework; Supreme Court standards for unreasonable applications)
United States v. Santiago, 268 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2001) (recidivism considerations and prior-conviction determinations)
Wilson v. Knowles, 638 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2011) (judge-made factual findings about prior offenses extending beyond prior conviction)