913 N.W.2d 95
S.D.2018Background
- On Feb 10, 2014 Garrido and Hoof bought a 1991 Honda Accord from Team Auto Sales (TAS) for $1,500 sold “AS IS—NO WARRANTY.” The car was loud, smelled of exhaust/gasoline, and required a jump to start; they did not have it inspected.
- Over the weeks after purchase Hoof complained of headaches from exhaust smell; windows were often kept down. The muffler was later found missing and the tailpipe terminated under the rear seat.
- On April 1, 2014 Appellants sat in the parked, running vehicle for ~30–45 minutes (windows mostly open, later closed when it rained). Soon after, six-year-old M.I. seized in the car and stopped breathing. Garrido and Hoof also experienced symptoms. Hospital tests showed elevated carboxyhemoglobin levels consistent with carbon monoxide (CO) poisoning; all three received hyperbaric treatment.
- Fire responders tested the vehicle roughly 38 minutes after it had been vacated; the passenger compartment showed 16 ppm CO. Responders noted the missing muffler and proximity of the tailpipe to the rear seat. Garrido installed a muffler soon after.
- Appellants sued TAS alleging theories including strict liability, negligence, misrepresentation, and breach of warranties, asserting the missing muffler caused the CO poisoning. TAS moved for summary judgment arguing insufficient evidence of causation. The circuit court granted summary judgment on causation; Appellants appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether evidence creates a jury question on causation (did missing muffler cause CO poisoning?) | Evidence and experts (paramedic report and treating physician) link CO exposure and timing to vehicle exhaust and missing muffler; circumstantial evidence suffices. | TAS: plaintiffs lack reliable expert proof of CO levels in cabin when occupants were present; without that expert proof causation is speculative. | Reversed: viewing evidence in plaintiffs’ favor (medical diagnoses, timing of symptoms, missing muffler, tailpipe location, differing CO levels among occupants) a reasonable jury could find the exhaust defect probably caused the exposure. |
| Whether expert testimony (Rule 702) was required/adequate to establish causation | Tjaden and Dr. Eide provided opinions supporting exposure-from-vehicle causation; circumstantial evidence supplements expert claims. | TAS contended Tjaden’s opinions unreliable and that causation was outside common experience, so summary judgment was proper without admissible expert proof. | Court held that even excluding some challenged expert opinions, unchallenged expert and circumstantial evidence create triable issue; circuit court erred to grant summary judgment on causation. |
| Whether circuit court abused discretion by denying $2,000 in expert fees for prep time for deposition noticed by TAS | Appellants sought reimbursement from TAS under SDCL 15-6-26(b)(4)(E) for expert time preparing/responding to discovery beyond deposition time. | TAS argued it is liable only for deposition time; additional time was expert work formulating opinions for plaintiffs, not responding to discovery. | Affirmed: appellate court found record insufficient to show that the disputed $2,000 was time "responding to discovery"; denial was not an abuse of discretion. |
| Remedy/proceeding disposition | Plaintiffs sought reversal and remand for trial on liability claims. | TAS sought affirmance of summary judgment. | Court reversed summary judgment on causation and remanded for further proceedings on liability; affirmed denial of expert fee reimbursement. |
Key Cases Cited
- McKie Ford Lincoln, Inc. v. Hanna, 907 N.W.2d 795 (S.D. 2018) (summary-judgment standard)
- Burley v. Kytec Innovative Sports Equip., Inc., 737 N.W.2d 397 (S.D. 2007) (plaintiff must show causal connection in products-liability case; cannot rely on accident alone absent obvious defect)
- Van Zee v. Sioux Valley Hosp., 315 N.W.2d 489 (S.D. 1982) (circumstantial evidence may suffice to infer causation)
- Weiss v. Van Norman, 562 N.W.2d 113 (S.D. 1997) (proximate-cause principles; causation usually a jury question)
- Wright v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 91 F.3d 1105 (8th Cir. 1996) (toxic-tort plaintiffs must show general and specific causation; evidence must permit reasonable conclusion defendant’s emission probably caused harm)