*1 BURLEY, Kylie Plaintiff Appellant, SPORTS
KYTEC INNOVATIVE
EQUIPMENT, INC., Defendant Appellee. District, School
West Central Party Defendant.
Third
No. 24132. Dakota.
Supreme Court South Nov. 2006.
Argued Aug. 2007.
Decided *3 use, one, Pashby, pacer, F. Tobin of athletes to called the Gary J. Michael LLP, Greenfield, Welk, Pashby, & Boyce, other, sprinter. sprinter Falls, Dakota, Attorneys for Sioux South hook, single a wears a belt with release plaintiff. pacer equipped and the wears belt A single swivel hook. cord connects Arndt, May R. Swier of <&
Mark J. Scott a post two runners. The cord is tied to Falls, Dakota, Johnson, PC, Sioux South It through other anchor. is then extended Attorneys appellee. for defendant and pulley on the back of the belt worn KONENKAMP, Justice. pacer through rope ring, to the end is attached to a release hook on the which injured Plaintiff when a *4 by sprinter. the The belt worn cord has by sports product manufactured defendant connection, “ripcord,” termed a her arm. Velcro malfunctioned and struck She which, brought against alleging according provided defendant to suit the instruc- (defective liability negligence, tions, strict de- “will break loose and release the (failure warn). sign), and strict to pull if [sjprinter greatf.]” the becomes too summary judgment Defendant moved for After the cord and belts are in sought prohibit on all claims and also to place, pacer sprinter begin the and the to testimony proposed expert the of her wit- direction, run the same either the finding plaintiffs expert ness. On that lanes, separate same lane or two but the qualified testify was not to the in- pacer sprinter. of the The pacer is ahead provided prod- structions with defendant’s sprinter, is to run faster than the effect inadequate, uct were the circuit court ex- pulling sprinter keep up to and there- testimony. The court cluded the then by increasing sprinter’s Ac- speed. granted summary defendant’s motion for instructions, cording rope to the will “[t]he that, judgment, ruling without testi- automatically Sprinter release from the mony, plaintiff had insufficient evidence to the Pacer slows down or proof meet her burden of on all her claims. when reaches the (located appeal, On we conclude that because the stopper ring 5 meters from the circuit high court set the bar too deter- ring; end You’ll see how it works when mining admissibility of the expert’s time.).” Also, you through walk it the first excluded, opinion, it not have should been sprinter the instructions indicate that the plaintiffs and thus failure to warn claims quick can release herself “with a chop affirm may proceed. be able to We downward to the tow line.” part, part, reverse in and remand. using was the Overspeed Trainer under the direction her West I. coach, High Central School track Darrell 12, 2001, April Kylie Burley, a [¶ 2.] On Horacek. Horacek track and assistant athlete, high injured in school her coach, Kennedy, Denise introduced the hallway using school a training while de- Overspeed brand new Trainer for the first provided. vice her It coaches is called the day Burley injured. time the Before Trainer, Overspeed manufactured and sold device, letting Hora- students use by Kytec Sports Equipment, Innovative Kennedy product’s cek and read the in- Inc. purpose Overspeed of the Train- attempted structions and to assemble it. help improve speed. er is to a runner’s Horacek found that the instructions were The device can be used for either resis- Kennedy It speed training. requires help. tance or two of no because Overspeed tion of the Trainer. She also using a similar device while experience had track University alleged Dakota’s de- South because defective during a team, warn, had used one strictly and Horacek sign Kytec and failure to University, at the training weekend injuries. Kytec brought hable for her prepare attempted two third-party complaint against West Cen- After Hora- use. Trainer for students’ indemnity for and con- tral School District it, to use it to attempted he cek assembled tribution.1 Dr. Jan Berkhout of the Uni- the instructions if it would release as see versity of Dakota was retained as an South the hook on the He noticed that indicated. expert solely Burley’s failure to warn downward, belt would rotate sprinter’s Burley sought opinion claims. to offer an virtually impossible for thereby “making it from Dr. Berkhout instructions the hook and chop’ a ‘downward release included with the Trainer were chop was a ring.” Because the downward “seriously deficient.” moved to ex- sprinter from the releasing means of clude and also this decided to bend the pacer’s pull, Horacek summary judgment on all claims. sought it for the just enough to make easier hook According Kytec, Dr. Berkh- He bent the hook ring to release. skill, knowledge, experience, out lacked the *5 using tried the de- using pliers and then necessary to render training, or education he that the again. vice This time believed this case. See SDCL expert opinion an after ring appropriately and released hook (Rule 702). In 19-15-2 its memorandum chop. the downward He of- applied he decision, that the circuit court concluded Trainer for use to Overspeed fered the proposed testimony Dr. Berkhout’s would track girls’ boys’ the and teams. both provide “the trier of fact with relevant it, boys Burley After the used [¶ 5.] evidence that would assist them in deter- try the device. girls was one of the first mining the instructions de- [were] whether entirely not Details of the accident are 2 However, ficient.” the court found that Burley clear from the record. recalled to offer an qualified Dr. Berkhout was injured when her arm was that she was expert opinion about whether the instruc- by ring from behind that was struck accompanying tions supposed sprinter’s to be attached to the inadequate improper. were ring belt. Horacek believed that recoiled, free, Burley. hit broke and then of professor Dr. Berkhout [¶ 8.] impact ring fractured the ulna Heims- Psychology and the Director of the arm, requiring surgery in her left bone Laboratory tra Human Factors at the Uni- implantation plate of a metal and versity degree Dakota. He has a of South screws. biopsychology and from the physiology 1962, University Chicago, obtained Burley brought against Ky- suit professional as a tec, and since 1993 is certified company negli- that the alleging by warnings, design, ergonomist and construc- the Board Certification gent its against confused or misled them. How- Burley claim West Cen- have been 1. settled her ever, Kytec product tral School District. was sold to knew this minor stu- where the users would be schools agree We with the circuit court that Dr. 2. or school dent athletes. It knew coaches Ky- opinions relevant. Berkhout’s would be actually personnel would be the ones who argues opinions about tec that Dr. Berkhout's used read the instructions before the students primarily are be- failure to warn irrelevant product. the instructions on cause never read Trainer, using so she could not Nonetheless, inadequate warnings, claims the court Ergonomists. Professional “Burley circuit court concluded that “Dr. presented held that has not this any specified has not received indicating Berkhout court with evidence that it product training or education related to would be able to meet its burden with instruction,” “expertise does not have Thus, respect to all those elements.” all syntax questions display, empha- negligence her and strict claims sis[,]” “personal experience no has Burley appeals. were dismissed. writing evaluating warning labels for II. equipment.” Accordingly,
athletic
granted Kytec’s
court
motion to exclude
circuit
We review
testimony.
Dr. Berkhout’s
deny an
court’s decision to admit or
ex
pert’s testimony under the abuse of discre
Kytec’s
The court then addressed
Guthrie,
tion standard. State v.
2001 SD
summary
In
judgment.
motion for
her
¶
(internal
30, 627
414-15
complaint, Burley alleged
Kytec “neg-
omitted);
citations
see also State
Edel
ligently designed and manufactured the
man,
52, ¶4,
419, 421
593 N.W.2d
Overspeed Trainer.” But she offered no
Bachman,
(citing
of fact
State v.
446 N.W.2d
assist
trier
(S.D.1989));
Harrison,
determining
whether the
Zens v.
(S.D.1995) (citations
defectively
designed
manufactured or
or N.W.2d
omit
in designing
ted);
whether the actions of
v. Logue,
State
(S.D.1985) (citations omitted).
manufacturing
were rea-
“Although
under
repeatedly
sonable
circumstances. The we have
invoked stock defini
tions,
court held that for
claim
this
testi-
the term ‘abuse of discretion’ defies
mony
necessary.
easy description.
It is a fundamental
*6
judgment,
error of
a choice outside the
Burley’s
alleging
As to
claim
[¶ 10.]
choices,
decision,
range
permissible
of
Kytec
strictly
inju-
liable for her
which,
consideration,
arbitrary
on full
is
or
ries because the device
in a
“was
defective
Arneson,
unreasonable.” Arneson v.
unreasonably
condition and was
danger-
¶
(citation
125, 14,
904,
SD
N.W.2d
ous,”
similarly
the court
concluded that
omitted.).
testimony
necessary.
In
expert
the
words,
court’s
“it cannot be said that com-
Admissibility
expert
experience
Burley’s inju-
mon
tells us that
testimony
governed by
is
SDCL 19-15-2
ries could not have occurred absent a de-
(Rule 702).
rule,
Under this
before a wit
Trainer,
Overspeed
fect
testify
expert,
ness can
as an
witness
negate
has failed to
other causes of her
Furthermore,
“qualified.”
must be
Id.
injuries, namely
user error or
Daubert,
proponent offering
“[u]nder
modification.”
expert testimony must show that the ex
Finally,
pert’s theory
qualifies
court
examined
or method
as scien
tific, technical,
Burley’s
claim that
specialized knowledge”
last
was hable
Guthrie,
provide adequate
for its failure to
required
warn-
as
under Rule 702.
¶ 34,
415-16;
ings
dangers
at
2001 SD
Pharmaceuticals,
Trainer. Because the court had excluded Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Inc.,
579, 597,
testimony,
question
Dr. Berkhout’s
be-
509 U.S.
113 S.Ct.
(1993).
proceed
came whether she could
without
would
Another case the circuit court
[¶22.]
There,
expert’s
“formal
Id.
expert.”
Young,
was Pearson v.
persuasive
found
of a col-
warnings
in
consisted
education
court
unreported
an
federal district
deci-
at
course.” Id.
entry-level psychology
lege
sion,
found at
See
party
expert testimony
who offers
is not
guidelines
Daubert’s criteria are flexible
prove
judge
to a
in a Daubert
required
applied identically
that cannot be
over a
hearing
expert’s opinion
is cor-
Indeed,
spectrum
disciplines.
broad
“
rect: all that must be shown is that ex-
rigor
‘the measure of intellectual
will
pert’s testimony
upon “good grounds,
rests
vary by
expertise
way
the field of
and the
Daubert,
on what
known.”
509
based
demonstrating
expertise
will also
”
590,
2795,
at
113
at
125 L.Ed.2d
U.S.
S.Ct.
Conn,
vary.’ United States v.
297 F.3d
(internal
omitted).
quotation
469
marks
(7th
548,
Cir.2002),
denied,
556
cert.
538
Any
expert’s
other
in an
opin-
deficiencies
969,
1767,
U.S.
123 S.Ct.
vancy prong, and we now set aside its
only
genuine
cide
whether there were
is
ruling
qualifications,
on his
court
never
sues of material fact and whether the law
reliability
reached
prong.
Daubert’s
Dau
Jeske,
correctly applied.”
Toben v.
bert sets out a number of nonexclusive
¶57, 9,
32,
(quot
2006 SD
718 N.W.2d
35
factors for determining whether scientific
¶98, 19,
ing
Lehrkamp,
Heib v.
2005 SD
592-95,
evidence is reliable.
407
Enterprises,
Premier Bank v.
a safer alternative.”5
manufactured
and/or
Kolcraft
Inc.,
“Kytec’s
that
own testi-
Burley responds
SD
[¶ 27.]
defectively
that a
designed.
product design or
gence for defective
manufacture,
that
plaintiff
a
must show
Burley argues
Kytee
should
failed to use the amount
the defendant
thus,
product,
have tested the
should
designing
manufacturing
care
have known that the hook was bendable.
reasonably
designer
careful
product that a
However, Burley
presented any
has not
cir-
or manufacturer would use
similar
if the hook
evidence
even
was benda-
a
exposing
to avoid
others to
cumstances
ble that such condition made the
harm.
foreseeable risk of
Restatement
Moreover,
undisputed
defective.
it is
§
of Torts
395. To determine
Second
design
altered the
of the Over-
Horacek
designer or manufacturer
whether
Burley’s injury.
speed
before
care,
reasonable
one must balance
used
Therefore,
if
bendability
even
of the
knew
designer
what the
or manufacturer
arguably
danger-
hook
created a defect or
the likelihood
or should have known about
product, expert
in the
testi-
ous condition
severity
potential
harm from the
mony
explain
jury
is needed to
to the
how
product against
taking
the burden of
safe-
Trainer,
design
harm.
ty measures to reduce or avoid the
alteration, proximately caused
Horacek’s
Id.
Burley’s injuries.
Caldwell v. John
“Whether a manufac
(S.D.1992)
Co.,
Morrell &
actions of an
manufacture
”
(citation omitted);
therefore,
son ....
Id.
see
the circuit court
required, and
Raymond Corp.,
Anderson v.
340 F.3d
summary
properly granted
judgment.
Cir.2003)
(8th
520,
(reaching the
524-25
claim,
In her next
summary
upholding
same decision and
Burley alleges
Kytec
responsible
that
is
negligence, strict
judgment for claims of
(defective
theory
liability
under a
of strict
liability, and failure to warn due to lack of
liability
design). Strict
arises when a
law);
testimony under Arkansas
any product
manufacturer “sells
in a defec
Co.,
Erling v. American
230 F.3d
Allsafe
unreasonably dangerous
tive condition
to
(8th Cir.2000) (unpublished) (uphold
1362
Peterson,
the user or consumer....”
400
ing summary judgment
negligent
on
fail
omitted).
(citations
warn,
at 912
“It
negligent design,
ure to
and strict N.W.2d
liability
of lack of
claims because
the unreasonableness of the condition of
law).
testimony under North Dakota
of
product, not of
conduct
(cit
defendant,
liability.”
that creates
Id.
duty
A manufacturer’s
to
Co.,
ing
Lacquer
v. Coast Paint &
Jackson
inspect traditionally
give
and
test
does not
(9th Cir.1974)).
burden Lastly, Burley asserts legal cause element proximate the or for that Kytec is liable for its failure to warn her claim. dangerous condition of the Over- negligence As with her Trainer. To on a claim for speed prevail claim, Kytec Burley contends that because (failure warn), liability Burley strict to be Overspeed that the Trainer would knew that must establish bent, it if the hook were should unsafe danger 1. a existed associated with a that product a “with a hook designed have product; foreseeable use of the it.” Ac attempts to bend would withstand warning 2. an re- inadequate given was testimony is not cording Burley, expert to garding danger; the jury to a that a necessary explain to inadequate 3. as a result of the warn- used, have been there stronger hook could ing, product the was rendered defec- by making product the safer. unreasonably dangerous; tive and identify to required is unreasonably 4. the defective and dan- jury purportedly the defective how gerous condition existed at the time proximate legal cause hook was it left the control of the manufactur- this, has not Burley’s injuries. On she er; solely on offered evidence. She relies stronger product expected that a hook could 5. and did argument her not, made, it and because was reach the user without a substantial have been change defective and unforeseeable the condi- injured the defect caused because she was tion that it was in when it left the control; injury. her manufacturer’s legal 6. the defective condition was the A central element to her 34.] [¶ injuries. cause [her] (defective manu liability design or strict facture) Jury Dakota Pattern Instruction that the was the South claim is defect under strict is injuries. legal prox 150-04. “The issue cause of her While a a whether the manufacturer’s failure to ade- generally jury question, imate cause is product warn rendered the unrea- relationship alleged quately between the causal sonably dangerous regard To without to injury presumed. defect and of the failure to warn summary judgment, a motion for reasonableness survive ‘[unsup judged by negligence standards.” Peter- present “must more than (citation omitted). son, at 912 speculative state 400 N.W.2d ported conclusions “Further, ments, not be genuine is itself need do not raise [which] ” a manufacturer or seller fact.’ Bordeaux v. Shannon defective. Where sue of Schools, ¶14, may anticipate danger County 707 has reason prod- use of Paradigm particular [the] Hotel result from a (quoting N.W.2d Co., uct, give fails to [the manufacturer] Falls Hotel Mortg. Fund Sioux (ad (S.D.1994)) Inc., danger, adequate warning of such omitted). warning is in a has not sold without such ditional citation She liabili- condition within the strict evidentiary tending basis defective provided Jahnig, 283 at 560 injury ty caused doctrine.” show (citations omitted); v. Par- see also Prince than the alteration of the defect rather 1984) (Alaska alteration, achutes, Inc., though seeable and even 685 P.2d (citations omitted). bent, legally the failure to hook was warn injuries.7 prior with her caused her As Although it is not clear from claims, Burley directs this Court testi- negli- briefs whether plaintiffs appellate mony from that it did not test or remains in issue here gent failure to warn inspect put- Trainer before opinions Dr. Berkhout’s were or whether it commerce and ting into stream of claim, support quali- of such his offered Kytec acknowledged were no there fications, subject reliability finding, to a *13 Overspeed kind on the warnings of that claim. may support be sufficient to accompany- Trainer or the instructions liability negligent failure To establish Thus, ing Kytec it. because knew that the (1) warn, prove a claimant must that the to if the Overspeed Trainer would be unsafe reasonably manufacturer knew or should bent, Burley hook was insists that this product danger- have known that the was a admission alone creates material issue likely dangerous ous or was to be when (failure fact on her claim for strict manner; reasonably used in a foreseeable warn). to (2) reasonably the manufacturer knew or that would not should have known users Although Kytec [¶ acknowl 38.] (3) danger; the that the manufac- realize edged that a hook would make the bent turer failed to exercise reasonable care unsafe, Overspeed Trainer and conceded adequately danger and warn of the or that it did not or the inspect product test (4) product; on the safe use of the instruct adequate warning to determine whether that a manufacturer under the reasonable provided against bending have should been or circumstances have same similar would hook, the fact that an accident oc danger warned of the or instructed on the Burley using curred while was the Over- (5) that claim- product; safe use of the that speed perforce Trainer does not mean (6) harmed; ant was and that the manufac- Kytee’s legal failure to warn was the cause a turer’s failure to warn or instruct was injuries. Indeed, Burley’s a manufac proximate legal or cause of the claimant’s duty inspect turer has a to test and its injury. Restatement Second Torts duty a can products and breach of this Coisman, Jahnig § 388. See also product render a a defective. (citations (S.D.1979) 557, 560 omit- cannot, inspect standing failure to test or ted). alone, resulting injury. cause See su Rather, duty n. to pra “may 6. warn is an essen [¶ 37.] Causation duty a encompass product well to test a to tial element in a failure to warn claim. Kociemba, F.Supp. discover defects.” Therefore, a to survive motion for sum (quoting Poultry at 1527 Co. v. Willmar mary judgment, Burley present must suffi Carcus Chemical bending that cient evidence to show (Minn.Ct.App.1985)). the hook a foreseeable alteration that Therefore, Burley product unreasonably dangerous. made the must estab- relationship Kytec’s a causal between She must also establish should lish warning against injury. a this fore- failure to warn and her This re- have included Court, Kytec reading 7. In its brief to this contends the instructions before the student Burley did not read the instruc- Overspeed that because tions, athletes’ use of the Trainer. proper party bring a Therefore, failure to that fact that did not read Horacek, would be Horacek. warn claim the instructions is immaterial. however, parens patriae in a role as when GILBERTSON, Chief Justice de- product’s about the quires ZINTER, Justice, how, Horacek bent concur. though even and sign hook, warnings included the lack of MEIERHENRY, [¶ 44.] SABERS Trainer was or on Justices, part and dissent in concur her injuries. As with of her legal cause part. claims, for failure causation previous be- testimony. It is requires
warn
SABERS,
(concurring
part
&
Justice
jury
expertise of
the common
yond
dissenting
part).
(1)
determine
unreasonably dangerous
or
defective
way,
If the trial court had its
inspect
to test or
Kytec’s failure
on
based
designed prod-
specially
manufacturers of
(2)
of the hook was
it,
bending
Horacek’s
man-
plagiarize
copy
ucts could
another
Ky-
change
foreseeable
testing,
using,
without
ufacturer’s
(3)
duty
against,
to warn
tec had
use,
instructing
proper
designing,
bent, Kytec’s
the hook was
though
even
*14
use. The
warning
improper
product
on
legal cause of
warn was the
failure to
unworkable, defective, dangerous
could be
injuries.
Burley’s
Dakota
and could be marketed to South
al-
product
the
not been
Had
[¶40.]
liability.
almost without risk or
consumers
accident,
may
the
tered before
majority
opinion puts
Thank
the
God
ex-
evidence without
have had sufficient
scenario,
part.
at
least
stop to that
a misuse or
testimony because absent
pert
However, the trial court made
the
[¶ 46.]
to infer
may
it
be reasonable
alteration
errors,
majority
many other
which the
legal
proxi-
the
Overspeed Trainer was
However,
injuries.
failed to correct. These errors
opinion
cause of her
mate
failure to test
liability
Kytec’s
for
from an excessive view of the need
impose
result
Trainer,
“where
inspect
testimony
qualifications
and
the
and the
harm to [Bur-
link to the known
therefore,
summary judgment
the causal
a rush to
testing
unknovm outcome
ley]
exist,
is the
material fact
issues of
genuine
when
done,
the
beyond
would be
that was not
admissibility
on
emphasis
and excessive
identi-
any ...
tort doctrine we can
pale of
opinion
evidence.
weight
over the
265;
Valentine,
at
Cal.Rptr.2d
81
fy.” See
majority
indicated
the
As
[¶ 47.]
Kociemba,
at 1527.
F.Supp.
707
see also
24, all that must be
opinion
paragraph
at
to ren-
qualified
Dr. Berkhout is
[¶ 41.]
upon
expert’s
rest
shown is
the failure to warn claims.
opinions on
der
on what is known.”
“good grounds, based
respect
to those claims
Accordingly, with
Daubert,
at
at
509 U.S.
113 S.Ct.
(strict
if the cir-
liability
negligence),
omitted).
(internal
The
quotations
of Dr. Berkhout’s
cuit court finds
702)
(Rule
one of admissi
clearly “is
rule
reliability prong from
meet
the
opinions
supra
than exclusion.” See
bility rather
DaubeH,
will be suffi-
opinions
then those
¶24
Arcoren, 929 F.2d at
(quoting
4n.
presented
these claims to be
cient for
1239).
majority opinion corrects
hand,
the other
should
jury.
On
part.
error on this
trial court’s
unreliable,
these
opinions
court find
expert opin-
proceed
claims cannot
without
opinion
majority
[¶ 48.]
testimony.
ion
of the mis-
the remainder
fails to correct
of sum-
supporting reversal
takes. Facts
Affirmed
part,
reversed
2)
1)
negligence
mary judgment
part, and remanded.
(defective
Co.,
(S.D.
design) appear
strict
v. Budd
¶
1986).
majority opinion
at 4 as follows:
it,
attempt-
After Horacek assembled
he
Moreover,
Eighth
Circuit
to use it to see if it would release as
ed
held,
has
and this Court has noted in one
the instructions indicated. He noticed
cases,
of our
that “where there exists both
sprinter’s
the hook on the
belt
design
product,
defect and misuse of the
downward, thereby “mak-
would rotate
it
is assumed that each contributes to
ing
virtually impossible
it
for a ‘down-
accident,
product
the misuse of the
chop’ to release the hook and
ward
intervening
not an
cause if the misuse was
ring.”
chop
Because the downward
(quoting Griggs
foreseeable.” Id.
v. Fire
releasing
sprinter
a means of
from
stone Tire & Rubber
513 F.2d
pacer’s pull,
Horacek decided to
(8th Cir.)
denied,
861-62
cert.
423 U.S.
just
the hook
it
enough
bend
to make
(1975)).
S.Ct.
L.Ed.2d 93
ring
for the
easier
to release. He bent Therefore, Kytec cannot escape liability
using pliers
hook
and then tried
because of the alteration.
admitted
time,
using
again.
the device
This
he
dangerous
would be
if the
believed that
ring
the hook and
released
bent, yet
testing
hook was
did no
to ensure
appropriately
applied
when he
the down-
the hook could not be bent
even
warn
chop.
ward
consumers not to bend the hook. The
¶
.
Supra
4.
coach
bent the hook so the
would
Because the hook would rotate
purported
release as the instructions
it
*15
downward,
virtually
it was
for a
impossible
Burley
would.
great
injury.
suffered a
chop
downward
to release the hook and Kytec
escape liability
should not
because
ring. Obviously, it was foreseeable that
the trial court
majority opinion
and the
someone would bend this hook to allow the
jury
expert testimony
believe the
needs
to
release,
ring
especially
to
in view of the
spoon
something
feed it
that can be de
contrary
absence of instructions to the
by
jury
duced
itself under the facts
chop
the fact that
the downward
was a presented.
safety
addition,
purported
release.
In
if
questions present
These
genu-
bent,
the hook should not have been
it
concerning neg-
ine issues of material fact
could have
designed
been so
or made with
(defective
ligence,
liability
design).
strict
sturdier
prevent bending.
materials
to
The trial court
supposed
is
to maintain an
majority
opinion
claims
has
field,
playing
even
uphill.
not one slanted
provided
evidentiary
“not
tending
basis
supposed
gate
The trial court is
to be the
injury
to show that the
was caused
keeper,
goal keeper,
not the
nor the score
defect rather
than the alteration of the
keeper. We should reverse and remand
¶
product.” Supra
34.
the fact
for a fair trial on all issues.
bent,
ring
coupled
that the
could be
It was clear error
for the trial
product
admissions
knew the
court and
majority opinion
to affirm
bent,
dangerous
ring
would be
if the
summary
judgment
negligence,
testing
and did no
to
if
ring
discover
(defective
liability
design)
strict
bent,
when the
ample
could be
is
evidence for the
expert opinion
admission of Dr. Berkhout’s
jury.
recognizes
“The law
that there can
testimony,
by Kytec
be strict
of a
admissions
supplier
though
even
the common sense and
changed
knowledge
is altered or
if it is
jury may
enough
support
foreseeable that
the alteration would
be more than
to
be
made and
change
majority
does not unforesee-
all three causes of action. The
ably
opinion
render the
unsafe.” Zacher
imposing liability
Ky-
claims
“for
the Over-
inspect
to test and
failure
tec’s
and should be right
ing party has established no clarity as to leave
judgment with such controversy”).
room for decided case is one to be This
[¶53.] affirm a jury. inappropriate “It is
by a summary judgment grant court’s
trial the non-
merely might because we believe prevailed not have at
moving party would ¶98, 46, Heib, 2005
trial.” SD *16 (Sabers, J., dissenting) (citing at 891 Wulf Senst, 105, ¶17, 669 N.W.2d
135, 141). Summary is not to judgment be outcomes are to control cases whose
used
in doubt. genu- material issues of Because expert testimony is not
ine fact exist and Burley’s
necessarily support needed
claims, I dissent.
MEIERHENRY, (concurring in Justice dissenting part).
part (Daubert) I concur Issue join dissent on the Justice Sabers’
other issues.
