349 So.3d 873
Fla.2022Background
- A.B. and Jonathan Tait had consensual sex in Tait’s apartment; Tait left briefly and A.B. lay on the bed facing away from the doorway. Garrett Statler (Tait’s roommate) entered, had intercourse with A.B. without identifying himself, and A.B. believed it was Tait until she turned and discovered otherwise. A.B. immediately alleged rape and reported to police.
- Statler was charged under section 794.011(5)(b), Florida Statutes (2015), for sexual battery (adult-on-adult without consent and without force likely to cause serious injury).
- At trial Statler moved for judgment of acquittal arguing a reasonable hypothesis of innocence that he believed A.B. consented; the court denied the motion and instructed the jury that the defendant’s belief in consent is not a defense. The jury convicted and the trial court sentenced Statler to prison and sex-offender probation.
- The First District summarily affirmed, rejecting Statler’s facial constitutional challenge and his claim that the statute must be read to require proof that the defendant knew or should have known of nonconsent, relying on Watson v. State and distinguishing Giorgetti.
- The Florida Supreme Court granted review to decide whether subsection (5)(b) requires proof of the defendant’s knowledge (mens rea) regarding the complainant’s nonconsent and whether the statute is facially unconstitutional.
Issues
| Issue | Statler's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 794.011(5)(b) requires proof that the defendant knew or should have known the victim did not consent | Statler: statute must be read to include a scienter requirement as to nonconsent; his reasonable belief in consent is a defense | State: statute requires proof only that the act occurred without the victim’s consent; no subjective knowledge element is required | Held: No knowledge/specific-mens-rea element for nonconsent is required; statute targets absence of consent as an objective element, not the defendant’s subjective belief |
| Whether the statute is facially unconstitutional for lacking a mens rea element as to nonconsent (due process) | Statler: omission of a mens rea element renders the statute unconstitutional because it may criminalize innocent conduct | State: Legislature may create general-intent crimes; § 794.011(5)(b) is constitutional and requires general intent only | Held: Statute is constitutional on its face; sexual battery is a general-intent crime, not strict liability; no due-process violation shown |
| Whether sexual battery under § 794.011(5)(b) is a general-intent or specific-intent crime | Statler: argues for a required mens rea on nonconsent (specific intent) | State: sexual battery is a general-intent crime—only intent to commit the physical act is required | Held: Court treats sexual battery as a general-intent offense; intent to do the act suffices and attendant circumstance (nonconsent) is proved objectively |
| Whether statutory context/legislative drafting indicates an intended knowledge requirement | Statler: omission could be ambiguous, requiring judicial read-in of mens rea | State: other provisions in chapter 794 expressly impose knowledge requirements where intended; omission here is deliberate | Held: Context supports the Legislature’s deliberate inclusion of knowledge language elsewhere; omission in (5)(b) indicates no subjective-knowledge element was intended |
Key Cases Cited
- Watson v. State, 504 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (holding defendant’s knowledge of victim’s refusal is not an element of sexual battery)
- Giorgetti v. State, 868 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 2004) (presumption that statutes include mens rea but limited where statute punishes otherwise innocent conduct)
- Askew v. State, 118 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1960) (discussing rape as a general-intent crime; intent inferred from act)
- Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994) (background rule that some mens rea is ordinarily required unless statute indicates otherwise)
- Beach v. Great W. Bank, 692 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 1997) (statutory interpretation: express language in one provision implies omission in another is intentional)
- State v. Smith, 554 A.2d 713 (Conn. 1989) (consent measured by objective manifestations between the parties)
- Whitfield v. State, 923 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 2005) (voluntary intoxication is not a defense to general-intent crimes)
- United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922) (distinguishing strict liability regulatory offenses from crimes requiring mens rea)