Garland Garner, 664 F. App'x 441

Background

Garland D. Garner pleaded guilty in 2013 to being a felon in possession of a firearm while on pretrial release and was sentenced to 110 months based in part on a career-offender/crime-of-violence enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a).
The district court treated Garner’s prior Michigan conviction for attempted assault with intent to commit great bodily harm less than murder as a “crime of violence,” increasing his offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(1).
Garner’s plea agreement contained an express, knowing, and voluntary waiver of his rights to appeal and to contest his conviction or sentence in any post-conviction proceeding, including under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
Garner previously appealed and filed a § 2255 motion; both were rejected based on the plea waiver.
Garner moved for authorization to file a second or successive § 2255 motion invoking Johnson v. United States (invalidating the ACCA residual clause) and related Sixth Circuit decisions finding the identical Guidelines residual clause vague.
The majority denied authorization on the ground that Garner’s collateral-attack waiver bars his Johnson-based successive claim; Judge Keith dissented, arguing the panel should permit filing for district-court adjudication because Garner disputes the waiver’s validity and the court’s role at the authorization stage is limited.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Johnson-based challenge supports authorization of a second/successive § 2255	Garner: Johnson (and related Sixth Circuit precedents) removes the residual-clause basis for his career-offender enhancement, so he has a new, retroactive constitutional rule	Government: Even if Johnson applies, Garner waived his right to collateral attack in a knowing, voluntary plea agreement	Denied — waiver bars the successive § 2255 filing
Whether a plea waiver that precludes collateral relief is enforceable when law later changes	Garner: He could not have knowingly relinquished a Johnson-type claim decided after sentencing; waiver may be invalid as to this new rule	Government: A valid, knowing waiver remains binding despite intervening changes in law (Bradley principle)	Enforceable — subsequent legal developments do not render a knowing waiver involuntary
Whether the panel should screen for possible merit (prima facie) and allow the district court to decide waiver validity	Garner: Court of appeals at authorization stage must apply lenient prima facie standard and permit district court to resolve waiver validity	Government: The appellate court may deny authorization based on the written, knowing waiver without remanding	Majority: Denied authorization; dissent argues the panel improperly acted as first-view and should have let district court examine waiver validity
Whether Johnson is a new rule with retroactive effect for successive petitions	Garner: Johnson (and related Sixth Circuit applications) creates a retroactive substantive rule that can support successive relief	Government: Johnson is retroactive under Welch; but waiver forecloses relief here	Majority: Acknowledges Johnson is retroactive but enforces waiver regardless

Key Cases Cited

Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (invalidated ACCA residual clause as unconstitutionally vague)
Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016) (held Johnson announces a substantive rule with retroactive effect)
United States v. Pawlak, 822 F.3d 902 (6th Cir. 2016) (applied Johnson to the identical Guidelines residual clause)
United States v. Bradley, 400 F.3d 459 (6th Cir. 2005) (upheld plea waivers against later changes in law; waiver remains binding if knowing)
In re Acosta, 480 F.3d 421 (6th Cir. 2007) (caution that it is circular to invoke a waiver to bar a challenge to the waiver itself)
Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (new substantive rules generally apply retroactively)
In re Watkins, 810 F.3d 375 (6th Cir. 2015) (standard for authorizing successive § 2255 filings)