329 Ga. App. 756
Ga. Ct. App.2014Background
- City and Chatham County entered a written County-City Agreement creating a multijurisdictional Counter Narcotics Team (CNT); City could assign officers to CNT for set "tours of duty."
- Assigned officers remained City employees; CNT commanding officer had "exclusive directive supervision and authority" over assigned officers during tours of duty.
- Agreement stated the CNT commander could request replacement of an officer (City had 30 days to comply), and City retained ultimate authority to terminate employment or remove an officer generally.
- Officer Judd West was assigned to the CNT, acting under CNT orders when his vehicle collided with Muse’s vehicle; Muse sued for negligence, naming City and County among defendants.
- City moved for summary judgment, arguing the borrowed-servant rule made the County (the borrowing employer) solely liable; trial court denied, finding a jury question on whether County had exclusive discharge authority; Court of Appeals granted interlocutory review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the borrowed-servant doctrine applies to excuse City liability | Herrera argued the County did not have the exclusive right to discharge West from his work because the Agreement only allowed the CNT commander to request replacements and City retained ultimate employment control | City argued the Agreement and testimony show the CNT (County) had exclusive control over West on the occasion of the injury and the unilateral right to discharge him from that particular task, satisfying all borrowed-servant prongs | Court held the borrowed-servant rule applied: CNT had complete control and exclusive right to discharge West from the specific task at the time of the accident, so City was not liable; summary judgment should have been granted to City |
| Whether the third prong (exclusive right to discharge) is defeated by City's retained general termination rights | Herrera: City's general right to terminate or remove officers means County lacked exclusive discharge authority | City: the relevant inquiry is the right to discharge from the specific task at the time of injury; City’s general termination power is irrelevant if it could not countermand CNT instructions on that occasion | Court held the third prong focuses on the occasion of injury; County had exclusive unilateral authority to discharge West from the particular work he was performing, so the third prong is satisfied |
| Whether contract-construction rules alter the borrowed-servant analysis | Herrera argued ambiguities in the Agreement create factual issues for the jury | City argued the Agreement clearly allocated control and discharge authority to CNT for tours of duty | Court did not need to reach this argument because it resolved the borrowed-servant issue in City’s favor based on the Agreement and testimony |
| Whether Preston and Six Flags are controlling precedent | Herrera said Preston misread Six Flags and is an outlier | City relied on Six Flags, Preston, and similar cases to show a borrowing employer’s unilateral right to discharge the employee from the task suffices | Court found Preston consistent with Six Flags and controlling: focus is on unilateral right to discharge from the specific task at issue |
Key Cases Cited
- Six Flags Over Ga., Inc. v. Hill, 247 Ga. 375 (Supreme Court of Ga.) (borrowed-servant third prong satisfied where borrowing employer could unilaterally discharge employee from the specific work)
- Hoffman v. Wells, 260 Ga. 588 (Supreme Court of Ga.) (statement of borrowed-servant doctrine and summary judgment standards)
- Preston v. Ga. Power Co., 227 Ga. App. 449 (Court of Appeals of Ga.) (held borrowing employer’s unilateral right to discharge from particular work satisfies third prong)
- Jarrara v. Doyle, 164 Ga. App. 339 (Court of Appeals of Ga.) (special master had exclusive right to dismiss employee from particular task; borrowed-servant test met)
- Fulghum Indus., Inc. v. Pollard Lumber Co., 106 Ga. App. 49 (Court of Appeals of Ga.) (explains third-prong focus on the specific task)
- Tim's Crane & Rigging, Inc. v. Gibson, 278 Ga. 796 (Supreme Court of Ga.) (when a written contract sets forth borrowed-servant requirements, contract controls)