570 F.Supp.3d 659
E.D. Wis.2021Background
- Nelson Garcia was identified from bank surveillance, arrested Jan. 2, 2012, and within 48 hours a Milwaukee court commissioner completed a CR-215 probable-cause form and set bail.
- Hours after the CR-215 was signed, police conducted a post-arrest in-person lineup without appointed counsel; a teller identified Garcia.
- Garcia later moved to proceed pro se at a June 29, 2015 pretrial hearing; the court conducted a colloquy, voiced concern about his behavior, and ultimately denied his request and kept appointed counsel (Bihler).
- Garcia was tried, convicted, and exhausted state appeals (Wis. Ct. App. affirmed; Wisconsin Supreme Court summarily affirmed by an equally divided court).
- On habeas review under AEDPA, the federal magistrate judge found (1) Garcia’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached at the county’s CR-215 probable-cause proceeding and thus was violated by the uncounseled lineup, and (2) the state courts applied the wrong standard in denying Garcia’s Faretta request; the writ was granted and release ordered unless the State retried him.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached before the uncounseled post-arrest lineup | Garcia: Rothgery (and Wade/Gilbert) mean the right attaches at the initial judicial probable-cause determination; Milwaukee’s CR-215 is functionally equivalent to Rothgery’s proceeding | State: Rothgery requires the defendant’s personal appearance and a formal “charge”; CR-215 was an all-paper review and did not formally charge Garcia, so the right had not attached | Court: State court unreasonably applied Rothgery; CR-215 is functionally equivalent and triggered the right, so the uncounseled lineup violated the Sixth Amendment |
| Whether trial court unlawfully denied Garcia’s Faretta request to represent himself | Garcia: He made a knowing request; the court improperly forced counsel on him absent deliberate, serious obstructionist misconduct (Faretta/Allen) | State: Garcia’s courtroom behavior and history frustrated orderly progression; state standard justified denying pro se request | Court: State court applied a lower, contrary standard (focusing on “orderly and efficient progression”); under Faretta/Allen denial was improper; habeas relief warranted |
Key Cases Cited
- Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 554 U.S. 191 (U.S. 2008) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at the initial appearance before a judicial officer where the accused is informed of formal accusation and liberty is restricted)
- United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (U.S. 1967) (uncounseled post-indictment identification procedures implicate Sixth Amendment right to counsel)
- Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (U.S. 1967) (same-day companion case to Wade on counsel at identification proceedings)
- County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (U.S. 1991) (Fourth Amendment requires prompt probable-cause determinations; states may structure procedures to satisfy this requirement)
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1975) (criminal defendants have the right to represent themselves provided the waiver of counsel is knowing and intelligent)
- Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (U.S. 1970) (defendant may lose some trial rights, including presence, for persistent disruptive conduct after warning)
- Martinez v. Court of Appeal, 528 U.S. 152 (U.S. 2000) (Faretta right is fundamental but not absolute; courts may balance self-representation against trial integrity)