108 N.E.3d 945
Mass.2018Background
- DHCD administers Massachusetts Emergency Assistance (EA) shelter program (≈3,500 families); statutory line-item provisos direct placements as close as possible to home community (within 20 miles) and authorize motel spending when contracted shelter beds are unavailable.
- DHCD has substantially expanded family-shelter capacity since 2013 and implemented a policy that generally avoids assigning new families to motels except in rare exigencies; motels are used as interim overflow when contracted beds are unavailable.
- EA participants may request ADA accommodations (e.g., transfers closer to providers, non‑congregate units); DHCD approves many transfers but often implements them only "when administratively feasible," i.e., when an appropriate contracted shelter unit becomes vacant.
- Plaintiffs (class certified) sued alleging DHCD’s motel policy and delays in effectuating ADA accommodations violated state placement provisos and Title II of the ADA; judge granted a class-wide preliminary injunction limited to class members whose ADA accommodations had been approved but not implemented and who could be accommodated by motel placement.
- On interlocutory appeal, the Appeals Court reviewed whether plaintiffs were likely to succeed on ADA claims that (a) delay or refusal to use motels to effect approved accommodations is per se unlawful and (b) the motel policy has a discriminatory effect.
- Court majority vacated the injunction for lack of likelihood of success on the ADA claims given the preliminary record, while the dissent would have modified the injunction to require motel placement when DHCD cannot provide an approved accommodation within a reasonable time.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether DHCD's motel policy violates Title II reasonable‑accommodation rule by refusing motels when an approved ADA transfer is not immediately implemented | DHCD's refusal to use motels forces disabled families to wait months for approved transfers; unreasonable delay equals denial of reasonable accommodation, so DHCD must use motels when needed | DHCD says motel proviso merely authorizes motel spending when contracted shelter beds are unavailable; approved transfers implemented "when administratively feasible" is a reasonable practice | Court: plaintiffs have not shown likelihood of class‑wide success; judge erred to treat any delay as per se unlawful and to deem interim shelters immediately "ADA noncompliant"; vacate injunction and remand for fuller record |
| Whether delays in implementing approved ADA accommodations are per se ADA violations | Unreasonable delays (documented months) can constitute constructive denial; class relief warranted | Not every delay is unlawful; whether delay is unreasonable is fact‑specific and individualized | Court: delay may be unlawful in some cases but requires case‑by‑case analysis; preliminary record insufficient for class relief |
| Whether DHCD's motel policy has an unlawful disparate effect on people with disabilities under 28 C.F.R. §35.130(b)(1),(4) | Shifting resources to contracted shelters disproportionately impairs access to treatment for disabled families, producing disparate impact | Record only shows shift from motels to shelters; no comparative evidence that disabled families are worse off than nondisabled peers | Court: preliminary record lacks comparative analysis; plaintiffs not likely to succeed on disparate‑impact claim |
| Whether the preliminary injunction would ‘‘fundamentally alter’’ the EA program and exceed DHCD's statutory authority | Plaintiffs: limited injunction respects preference for shelters and only requires motels when needed to satisfy ADA accommodations | DHCD: ordering motels as "available" for ADA accommodations conflicts with statutory scheme and agency interpretation; could disrupt system and alter program | Court: injunction conflicted with DHCD’s reasonable statutory interpretation that motels are authorized only when shelter beds unavailable; potential systemic impacts require fuller record; injunction vacated |
Key Cases Cited
- Smith v. Commissioner of Transitional Assistance, 431 Mass. 638 (Mass. 2000) (recognizing urgency for families in EA context)
- Packaging Indus. Group, Inc. v. Cheney, 380 Mass. 609 (Mass. 1980) (standard of review for preliminary injunctions)
- Fordyce v. Hanover, 457 Mass. 248 (Mass. 2010) (appellate review: legal standards and factual support for injunction)
- PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (U.S. 2001) (reasonable‑modification analysis and individualized inquiry)
- Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261 (2d Cir. 2003) (plaintiff need only suggest a plausible accommodation whose costs do not facially exceed benefits)