Gannon v. City of Boston
476 Mass. 786
| Mass. | 2017Background
- Sean Gannon, a Boston police officer and former professional mixed martial arts fighter, suffered multiple concussions and other injuries and was placed on restricted/administrative (desk) duty beginning in 2005–2006; he remains barred from full patrol duty and from carrying a service weapon.
- Department psychiatrists and neuropsychologists (including Drs. Scott and Lezak) concluded Gannon has slowed response times and cognitive impairments that make full patrol unsafe; other treating/expert doctors (Drs. Nelson, Burns, McGrath) and simulation testing produced conflicting opinions that he could safely return to patrol.
- The department sought involuntary retirement; PERAC doctors found Gannon capable of patrol work, but the department kept him on desk duty; an arbitrator later upheld the department’s administrative-duty decision based on Dr. Lezak’s opinion.
- Gannon filed an MCAD complaint and then a Superior Court suit under G. L. c. 151B § 4(16), alleging handicap discrimination for assignment to desk duty.
- The motion judge treated the case as a pretext case, found the city proffered a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason (safety concerns from cognitive deficits), and granted summary judgment for the city; Gannon appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Gannon is a "qualified handicapped person" capable of performing essential patrol duties | Gannon can perform full-duty patrol with or without accommodation; medical and simulation evidence support qualification | City contends he is not qualified because cognitive impairments (slow reaction, poor decision-making under stress) make patrol unsafe | Court: disputed factual issue whether Gannon is qualified; summary judgment improper—factfinder must decide by preponderance |
| Proper analytical framework: pretext vs. qualified-handicapped-person | Gannon: case is a qualified-handicapped-person case (employer acted because of his handicap) | City treated it as a pretext case and argued only that its good-faith belief justified action | Court: should be analyzed as a qualified-handicapped-person case, not pretext; employer’s good-faith belief does not resolve qualification question |
| Burden of proof on safety risk | Gannon: plaintiff bears ultimate burden to prove he can perform essential functions safely | City: MCAD guidance places burden on employer to prove "reasonable probability of substantial harm" | Court: plaintiff always bears ultimate burden of proving qualification; but employer must first produce specific individualized evidence of unacceptable risk before plaintiff must prove safety |
| Standard to evaluate employer evidence of risk | Gannon: asks that mere employer belief is insufficient | City: relied on expert reports and arbitration findings to justify action as nondiscriminatory | Held: employer may present individualized, substantial evidence of an unacceptably significant risk, but the factfinder — not the employer’s good faith — decides if plaintiff meets burden of proof to be "qualified" and safe for the job |
Key Cases Cited
- Dahill v. Police Dep't of Boston, 434 Mass. 233 (court gives deference to MCAD guidelines in interpreting G. L. c. 151B)
- Dartt v. Browning-Ferris Indus. (Mass.), 427 Mass. 1 (plaintiff bears burden to prove qualification)
- Labonte v. Hutchins & Wheeler, 424 Mass. 813 (employer action because of limitations arising from a handicap is discrimination under § 4(16))
- Beal v. Selectmen of Hingham, 419 Mass. 535 (safety-sensitive jobs may make qualification impossible where handicap severely compromises capability)
- Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (employer’s good-faith belief of risk does not automatically absolve liability under disability-discrimination principles)