Gamble, Broderick Lamond, PD-0181-15

Background

Gamble pled no contest in two misdemeanor protective-order cases in Jan 2013 under a plea agreement that (1) recessed proceedings for 180 days, (2) allowed withdrawal of the plea and a reduction to a Class C disorderly-conduct plea if “no offenses [were] reported” during that period, and (3) was signed by defendant, counsel, prosecutor, and the trial judge.
The court did not enter a written adjudication at the January hearing and recessed the cases for six months.
In May 2013 Gamble was charged with new offenses. At a November 2013 hearing the court admitted, without objection, a computerized printout showing pending new charges, found Gamble guilty, and sentenced him to 90 days’ jail in each case.
Gamble attempted at sentencing to withdraw his jury-waiver and raised on the record that the plea was conditional/illegal and that the “no offenses reported” term was unconstitutionally vague; the trial court denied the late jury-waiver withdrawal and imposed sentence.
On appeal the Second Court of Appeals affirmed, holding Gamble forfeited his complaints by failing to timely object in the trial court and therefore declined to reach most merits issues.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Gamble)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether the plea-created, 180-day recess with a "no offenses reported" condition amounted to an unauthorized form of community supervision	The plea functionally placed Gamble on community supervision outside statutory authorization, implicating non-waivable or waivable-only rights — reviewable for the first time on appeal	Gamble forfeited the complaint by not raising it timely in the trial court; no statutory community supervision was imposed	Forfeited — appellate court refused to review; affirmed convictions
Whether the plea deprived Gamble of due process (vague "no offenses reported" condition, lack of admonishments/required procedures)	The condition was unconstitutionally vague and permitted revocation based on mere accusation rather than proof; statutory procedural safeguards were bypassed	Many due-process and related objections were not raised timely; only the vagueness claim was preserved sufficiently to consider	Most due-process claims forfeited for lack of timely objection; only vagueness claim addressed and held forfeited as not timely objected to at imposition
Whether separation-of-powers principles were violated by imposing non‑statutory supervision via plea	Plea terms deprived the court of legislative limits on supervision and violated separation of powers	Separation‑of‑powers challenge not preserved; Gamble pointed to no authority allowing a first‑time appellate fact‑specific separation‑of‑powers claim	Forfeited — separation‑of‑powers argument not preserved
Whether conditional/alternative pleas here are invalid or preserve issues for appeal	The plea was conditional/alternative and therefore illegal or void, permitting appellate review	Plea bargains can be complex and parties have latitude; Gamble failed to preserve the argument in trial court	Forfeited — appellate court declined to decide whether plea created unauthorized supervision or was an improper conditional plea

Key Cases Cited

Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (framework classifying rights for preservation: absolute, waivable-only, or request-activated)
Ex parte Williams, 65 S.W.3d 656 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (unauthorized probation is not necessarily an illegal/void sentence for first‑time appellate complaint)
Speth v. State, 6 S.W.3d 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (granting community supervision is a privilege and not a systemic right)
Leonard v. State, 385 S.W.3d 570 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (probation conditions cannot replace judicial fact-finding or admissibility safeguards)
Grado v. State, 445 S.W.3d 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (trial judge must consider full range of punishment; certain rights are waivable-only)
State v. Moore, 240 S.W.3d 248 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (parties have latitude to craft complex plea bargains)
State v. Dunbar, 297 S.W.3d 777 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (personal-jurisdiction defect allowed first-time appellate complaint; distinguished here)