Gallardo v. State of Arizona, 335 P.3d 523

Background

In 2010 the Arizona Legislature amended A.R.S. § 15-1441(A) to require that any county with a population of at least three million elect two additional at-large members to community college district governing boards and shorten board terms to four years.
Maricopa County (≈4 million) was the only county meeting the threshold; Pima and Pinal were far below and projected not to reach three million for many decades or centuries based on expert testimony.
Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment and injunction, arguing the Amendment is an unconstitutional special or local law under Ariz. Const. art. IV, pt. 2, § 19 because it effectively singles out Maricopa County.
The superior court upheld the Amendment; plaintiffs appealed.
The Court of Appeals reviewed de novo and applied the three-part test for population-based classifications (rational relation, inclusiveness, and elasticity) and focused on the elasticity prong.
The court concluded the Amendment is operationally inelastic because it is highly improbable any other county will reach the three million threshold within a reasonable time, making the law a prohibited special law; it reversed and remanded and awarded appellate attorneys’ fees under the private-attorney-general doctrine.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Amendment is an unconstitutional special or local law under Ariz. Const. art. IV, pt. 2, §19	Amendment creates a class of one (Maricopa); population threshold is not reasonably probable to be met by others, so law is special and unconstitutional	Classification is population-based and facially general; elasticity need not be temporally constrained and possibility (even distant) suffices	Held unconstitutional: fails elasticity prong because no reasonable probability other counties will meet 3M threshold in foreseeable future; statute is a special law
Whether the elasticity (openness) requirement allows a class that others will only reach in the distant future	Entry to class must be reasonably probable within a reasonable time; speculative or merely possible entry fails elasticity	Legislature need not guess; class is defined by population and not tied to a specific census date, so other counties could enter when they reach threshold	Held for plaintiffs: temporal component matters; speculative entry centuries away does not satisfy elasticity
Whether precedent (Long) requires ignoring temporal probability when assessing elasticity	Probable entry must be evaluated, Long does not eliminate temporal inquiry; other precedents support requiring reasonable probability	State relied on Long to argue no temporal limitation and that class is elastic because not tied to a census date	Court distinguished Long and followed cases requiring reasonable probability; Long did not resolve temporal-probability question here
Entitlement to attorneys’ fees on appeal under private-attorney-general doctrine	Plaintiffs argued they vindicated a constitutional rule benefitting many and fees warranted	State did not dispute fee award if plaintiffs prevailed	Held: plaintiffs prevail; appellate fees awarded upon compliance with appellate rule

Key Cases Cited

Town of Gilbert v. Maricopa County, 213 Ariz. 241 (Ariz. Ct. App.) (discussing elasticity and probability for population-based classifications)
Republic Inv. Fund I v. Town of Surprise, 166 Ariz. 143 (Ariz. 1990) (adopting three-part test for population-based classifications and defining elasticity)
Long v. Napolitano, 203 Ariz. 247 (Ariz. Ct. App.) (upholding population classification tied to counties over two million but did not resolve temporal-probability issue)
In re Cesar R., 197 Ariz. 437 (Ariz. Ct. App.) (invalidating a population-based classification because counties aside from Maricopa and Pima would not reach threshold for many years)
State Comp. Fund v. Symington, 174 Ariz. 188 (Ariz. 1993) (explaining policy behind special-law prohibition and need for statewide uniformity)
Dobson v. State, 233 Ariz. 119 (Ariz. 2013) (setting out private-attorney-general standard for fee awards)