Gaede v. State, 2011 ND 162

Pederson, a suspect in several Grand Forks armed robberies, was targeted after a warrant issued for his home; surveillance and informant tips preceded action.
Officers traced Pederson’s movements with a confidential informant, leading to a motel room where Pederson and the informant stayed.
SWAT-style officers arrived at the motel with weapons drawn; Pederson exited the room, was ordered to the ground, and consented to officers entering the room.
Pederson was arrested and Miranda rights were given; he signed a waiver and was interrogated, leading to a confession of involvement in the robberies.
Pederson moved to suppress all evidence obtained after the motel entry and any statements after he invoked the right to counsel; the district court denied the motion.
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, treating the appeal from the suppression denial as an appeal from the ensuing criminal judgment.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the motel-entry was unlawful and the resulting arrest violated the Fourth Amendment	Pederson contends the entry was nonconsensual and unlawful	Pederson may have consented, but the entry was coerced by weapons and conditions	Unlawful entry; arrest invalid under Harris
Whether evidence obtained after the unlawful entry is admissible as fruit of the poisonous tree	All post-entry evidence should be suppressed	Harris attenuates the causal link due to probable cause to arrest	Not suppressed; statements admissible under Harris due to probable cause to arrest
Whether Pederson unambiguously invoked the right to counsel during interrogation	Pederson invoked his right to counsel	Statement shows no unambiguous request for counsel	No unambiguous invocation; interrogation continued with consent to speak
Whether the Harris exception applies under the North Dakota Constitution or the federal Constitution	Harris should apply; exclusionary rule would bar the statements	ND Constitution may offer greater protection; Harris analysis should apply only if proper under state law	Harris applicable; ND court preserves state-law questions but adopts Harris for federal guarantees

Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (U.S. 1980) (warrantless entry into home prohibited; applies to arrests in homes)
Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (U.S. 1964) (Fourteenth Amendment scope; motel room treated as dwelling for Fourth Amendment purposes)
Ellison v. City of Fargo, 635 N.W.2d 151 (N.D. 2001) (totality of circumstances standard for voluntariness of consent; coercion factors)
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (U.S. 1994) (unambiguous invocation required to terminate interrogation; ambiguous references do not)
New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (U.S. 1990) (probable cause to arrest before entry; attenuation rationale for statements post-entry)
State v. Woinarowicz, 720 N.W.2d 635 (N.D. 2006) (standard for suppression and credibility in suppression rulings)
State v. Greybull, 579 N.W.2d 161 (N.D. 1998) (clarifies unambiguous invocation of counsel under Davis)
State v. Kitchen, 572 N.W.2d 106 (N.D. 1997) (deferential review of findings; legal standard questions are reviewable)
State v. Ringquist, 433 N.W.2d 207 (N.D. 1988) (state constitutional analysis potential for greater protections)
State v. Stockert, 245 N.W.2d 266 (N.D. 1976) (state constitution interpretation precedent)