Gabriel Almanza-Arenas v. Loretta E. Lynch
815 F.3d 469
| 9th Cir. | 2015Background
- Petitioner Gabriel Almanza‑Arenas, a Mexican national, pleaded guilty in California (via a West/Alford plea) to violating Cal. Veh. Code § 10851(a) (unlawfully taking/driving a vehicle) in 2000 and was placed in removal proceedings after last entering the U.S. in 2000.
- Section 10851(a) criminalizes driving/taking a vehicle without consent with intent either to permanently or temporarily deprive the owner of title or possession.
- DHS argued the conviction was a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) because it can be a theft offense; the IJ and BIA concluded the conviction record was ambiguous and placed the burden on Almanza to prove he committed only a non‑CIMT (temporary) taking.
- The Ninth Circuit en banc examined whether § 10851(a) is a categorical match to a CIMT under the Descamps/Taylor/Shepard categorical approach and whether the statute is divisible (allowing the modified categorical approach).
- The en banc majority held § 10851(a) is overbroad (it covers temporary takings that are not CIMTs) and—after analyzing statutory text, Shepard documents, and California law—concluded the statute is indivisible; therefore a conviction under § 10851(a) is not categorically a CIMT and Almanza’s petition was granted and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Almanza) | Defendant's Argument (DHS/Gov't) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Cal. Veh. Code § 10851(a) is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude | § 10851(a) is not a categorical CIMT because it criminalizes temporary takings (non‑CIMT) as well as permanent takings | The statute can be treated as a CIMT because convictions may involve permanent deprivation; ambiguity in the record should defeat relief | Held: Not a categorical CIMT—statute is overbroad because it covers temporary takings |
| Whether § 10851(a) is divisible (so the court may apply the modified categorical approach) | Even if disjunctive, the statute’s alternatives are means (not separate elements); California law and jury instructions treat the alternatives as means, making the statute indivisible | The disjunctive mens rea phrasing creates alternative elements allowing application of the modified categorical approach; BIA was correct to require clarifying documents | Held: § 10851(a) is indivisible—text, Shepard documents, and California jury instructions show the alternatives are means, so inquiry ends |
| Whether the BIA/IJ properly required Almanza to produce plea colloquy under REAL ID/modified categorical approach | Almanza’s West plea (no factual admissions) made the plea colloquy irrelevant; Shepard documents produced show the charge encompassed both temporary and permanent intent | BIA/IJ required clarifying documents because petitioner bears burden to prove eligibility and the conviction record was ambiguous | Held: Ordering the plea colloquy was improper in substance—because the plea was a West plea, the plea colloquy would not alter the elements; BIA’s reliance on petitioner’s failure to produce it was legally unsound |
| Burden of proof for cancellation eligibility when conviction statute is overbroad | Categorical approach determines what the conviction necessarily established; uncertainty about actual conduct does not defeat relief when conviction necessarily rests on the least conduct criminalized | Government relied on Young and argued petitioner must rule out possibility he committed a disqualifying offense; ambiguity defeats eligibility | Held: The categorical approach controls; because § 10851(a) is indivisible and the least culpable conduct (temporary taking) is not a CIMT, petitioner’s conviction does not categorically disqualify him |
Key Cases Cited
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (framework for categorical/modified categorical approach and divisibility inquiry)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (Shepard‑approved documents and categorical approach methodology)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (limits on what conviction‑record documents courts may consult)
- Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013) (presume conviction rests on least conduct criminalized; categorical focus)
- Mellouli v. Lynch, 575 U.S. 798 (2015) (a conviction under an offense with multiple means rests on the least of the acts criminalized)
- Castillo‑Cruz v. Holder, 581 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2009) (theft offenses and when they constitute CIMTs)
- Duenas‑Alvarez v. Holder, 733 F.3d 812 (9th Cir. 2013) (analysis recognizing § 10851(a) may cover accomplice liability distinct issues)
- Young v. Holder, 697 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (contrasting precedent on burden when record is ambiguous)