2021 Ohio 2067
Ohio2021Background
- In 2016 a student shooting at Madison Junior/Senior High School wounded four students. In response, the Madison Local School District Board (the board) adopted an April 2018 resolution authorizing up to ten district employees to carry concealed firearms on school property for student safety.
- The board’s firearm-authorization policy required a concealed-handgun license, annual re-certification, and 24 hours of active-shooter and related training, but did not require the basic peace-officer training certificate or 20 years’ peace-officer experience specified in R.C. 109.78(D).
- Parents (Gabbard et al.) sued for declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing the board’s resolution violated R.C. 109.78(D); the trial court granted summary judgment to the board.
- The Twelfth District Court of Appeals reversed, holding R.C. 109.78(D)’s training-or-experience requirement applies to any school employee who goes armed while on duty.
- The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the appellate judgment: R.C. 109.78(D) applies to school employees who go armed while on duty, and R.C. 2923.122(D)(1)(a) does not allow boards to circumvent that requirement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Gabbard) | Defendant's Argument (Madison Bd.) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether R.C. 109.78(D) applies to teachers/other staff whom a board authorizes to carry firearms while on duty | R.C. 109.78(D) covers any school employee who "goes armed while on duty" and thus requires basic peace-officer training or 20 years' experience | R.C. 109.78(D) applies only to security/police-type positions that inherently require being armed; it does not cover ordinary teachers/staff | Held: R.C. 109.78(D) applies to any school employee who goes armed while on duty (including teachers/admins authorized by the board) |
| Whether R.C. 2923.122(D)(1)(a) authorizes a school board to permit employees to be armed notwithstanding R.C. 109.78(D) | R.C. 2923.122(D)(1)(a) cannot be used to evade other statutory requirements applicable to school employment | The board may rely on R.C. 2923.122(D)(1)(a) (exception to criminal liability) to authorize persons to carry and set its own training requirements | Held: R.C. 2923.122(D)(1)(a) merely excepts authorized persons from criminal liability; it does not override or allow circumvention of R.C. 109.78(D)’s employment-training requirement |
Key Cases Cited
- Progressive Plastics, Inc. v. Testa, 979 N.E.2d 280 (statutory interpretation: review de novo)
- Columbia Gas Transm. Corp. v. Levin, 882 N.E.2d 400 (give effect to legislature’s chosen words)
- Zumwalde v. Madeira & Indian Hill Joint Fire Dist., 946 N.E.2d 748 (apply unambiguous statutory language)
- Johnson v. Montgomery, 86 N.E.3d 279 (start and stop with plain language when unambiguous)
- Hulsmeyer v. Hospice of Southwest Ohio, Inc., 29 N.E.3d 903 (courts may not add words to statute)
- State v. Aspell, 225 N.E.2d 226 (ejusdem generis rule explained)
- United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87 (ejusdem generis is an interpretive aid when uncertainty exists)
- Jacobson v. Kaforey, 75 N.E.3d 203 (do not "dig deeper" than plain meaning under guise of interpretation)
- Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (judicial role: courts "say what the law is")