G. Thomas v. P. Grimm
155 A.3d 128
| Pa. Commw. Ct. | 2017Background
- Gregory Thomas, a juvenile probation officer, resigned after being suspended during an investigation into alleged misappropriation of funds; he claimed he was forced to resign in retaliation after truthfully reporting wrongdoing to detectives.
- Thomas sued in federal court under Pennsylvania’s Whistleblower Law; the federal court declined jurisdiction and he refiled in Washington County Court of Common Pleas.
- Defendant Patrick Grimm (Court Administrator) filed preliminary objections arguing the Whistleblower Law does not apply to judicial employees (separation of powers), that sovereign immunity bars official-capacity claims, and that Thomas failed to plead a valid whistleblower claim.
- Common Pleas sustained Grimm’s preliminary objections and dismissed Thomas’s complaint with prejudice. Thomas appealed to the Commonwealth Court.
- The Commonwealth Court considered whether the Whistleblower Law applies to judicial employees given (a) Russo v. Allegheny County holding that the Whistleblower Law does not apply to the Judiciary, and (b) the Supreme Court’s prior Code of Conduct Note referencing the Whistleblower Law. The Court also took limited judicial notice of a revised Code of Conduct.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the Whistleblower Law apply to judicial employees? | Thomas: Plain language of the statute and the Supreme Court’s 2010 Code Note invoking the Whistleblower Law show the Judiciary is covered. | Grimm: Application would violate separation of powers; Judiciary controls hiring/supervision so Legislature cannot impose these remedies. | Held: Whistleblower Law does not apply to the Judiciary; Russo controls and separation of powers bars application. |
| Does the Supreme Court’s Code of Conduct Note bring the Judiciary within the Whistleblower Law? | Thomas: The Code Note’s explicit reference to the Whistleblower Law demonstrates the Supreme Court intended coverage. | Grimm: The Note is descriptive only; the Supreme Court’s supervisory rulemaking does not amount to adopting the statute or waiving separation-of-powers protections. | Held: The Code Note is only descriptive and does not show intent to subject the Judiciary to the Whistleblower Law. |
| Would remedies under the Whistleblower Law be enforceable against judicial employers? | Thomas: Implied that statutory remedies could apply. | Grimm: Many statutory remedies (reinstatement, back pay, fees) would conflict with judicial supervisory authority and be partly unenforceable, creating constitutional problems. | Held: Remedies would infringe judicial independence and be unconstitutional as applied; supports exclusion. |
| Was sovereign immunity waived for claims against judicial employees under the Whistleblower Law? | Thomas: Statutory definitions of "employer" and "public body" evidence waiver. | Grimm: Sovereign immunity protects the Judiciary absent clear legislative intent to waive; applying the statute would violate separation of powers. | Held: Court did not decide waiver because it concluded the Whistleblower Law does not apply to the Judiciary. |
Key Cases Cited
- Russo v. Allegheny County, 125 A.3d 113 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (held the Whistleblower Law does not apply to the Judiciary; remedies would infringe separation of powers)
- Jefferson Cnty. Court Appointed Emps. Ass’n v. Pa. Labor Relations Bd., 985 A.2d 697 (Pa. 2009) (recognizes judiciary’s constitutional authority to hire, fire, and supervise court employees)
- Kremer v. State Ethics Comm’n, 469 A.2d 593 (Pa. 1983) (legislative encroachment on judicial supervisory authority is unconstitutional; Court may promulgate its own rules)
- Jakomas v. McFalls, 229 F. Supp. 2d 412 (W.D. Pa. 2002) (analyzed Whistleblower Law enforcement mechanisms and separation of powers concerns when applied to courts)