G. Lyon v. Gila River Indian Community, 688 F. App'x 477

Background

G. Grant Lyon sued the Gila River Indian Community over the scope of an easement across Murphy Road and related development rights for Section 16.
In 2010 the Ninth Circuit held Lyon lacked standing to press the easement‑scope claim because no live controversy or imminent particularized injury existed.
After remand, factual developments occurred and Lyon argued those changes created a justiciable controversy; the district court concluded Lyon had standing and adjudicated the easement scope, permitting a 40‑ft paved road, underground utilities, and a 440‑house development.
The Community appealed the district court’s May 2012 order finding standing and the May 2014 / March 2015 judgments on the easement’s scope and permitted uses.
The Ninth Circuit analyzed Article III standing principles and the rule that standing is ordinarily fixed at the time the complaint is filed, considering whether post‑filing events or a supplemental pleading could cure the prior defect.
The Ninth Circuit concluded the district court lacked jurisdiction over Lyon’s easement‑scope claim because Lyon never filed an amended or supplemental complaint under Rule 15(d) and no applicable exception allowed reliance on post‑filing events to create standing.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Lyon had Article III standing to pursue the easement‑scope claim after post‑filing factual changes	Post‑complaint events created a live, particularized injury giving standing	Standing must exist at filing; later events cannot cure a preexisting jurisdictional defect	Standing is determined at filing; Lyon lacked standing because he did not amend or supplement his complaint under Rule 15(d)
Whether a district court pretrial order can function as an amended complaint to cure standing deficits	The district court’s September 2014 pretrial order should operate as an amended complaint	Northstar limited Rule 15(d) relief to actual supplemental pleadings; a pretrial order cannot substitute	Pretrial order does not operate as an amended/supplemental complaint; Northstar does not apply here
Whether Northstar’s Rule 15(d) exception applies absent an actual supplemental pleading	Northstar’s rationale allows curing standing defects without re‑filing where post‑filing events occurred	Northstar requires a filed supplemental pleading; absent one, the exception doesn’t apply	Northstar limited to actual Rule 15(d) supplements; no cure without filing one
Whether requiring a new lawsuit would be a needless formality or affect tribal immunity rights	Instituting a new action would be an unnecessary formality	A new suit could materially affect the Community’s ability to raise sovereign immunity; thus, exceptions should not apply	Requiring a new lawsuit here would not be a mere formality; exception in Northstar not justified

Key Cases Cited

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (standing requires concrete, particularized injury fairly traceable and redressable)
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (standing must exist for federal jurisdiction and persist through litigation)
Northstar Financial Advisors Inc. v. Schwab Investments, 779 F.3d 1036 (Rule 15(d) supplemental pleading can cure pre‑filing standing defects in limited circumstances)
Wilbur v. Locke, 423 F.3d 1101 (standing is determined as of the date the complaint is filed)
Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. California State Board of Equalization, 858 F.2d 1376 (jurisdictional existence at commencement principle)
Yamada v. Snipes, 786 F.3d 1182 (standing determined at commencement with limited exceptions)
Davis v. Federal Election Comm'n, 554 U.S. 724 (plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim and form of relief)
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (standing requirement across claims and relief)

VACATED AND DISMISSED; costs taxed against plaintiff in favor of defendant.