G.G. Ex Rel. Grimm v. Gloucester County School Board
822 F.3d 709
4th Cir.2016Background
- G.G., a transgender male high‑school student assigned female at birth, was allowed by school staff to use the boys’ restrooms; public backlash prompted the Gloucester County School Board to adopt a policy limiting restroom use to "corresponding biological genders" and offering single‑stall unisex restrooms as alternatives.
- G.G. alleges the Board’s policy forces him to use separate facilities, stigmatizes him, causes psychological harm, and leads to medical issues (urinary tract infections).
- G.G. sued under Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause and moved for a preliminary injunction to use the boys’ restrooms; the district court dismissed the Title IX claim and denied the injunction.
- The Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) issued a January 2015 letter saying schools that separate facilities "on the basis of sex" generally must treat transgender students consistent with their gender identity; the U.S. (as amicus) defended OCR’s interpretation.
- The Fourth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the Title IX claim (holding OCR’s interpretation of 34 C.F.R. §106.33 is entitled to Auer deference), vacated the denial of the preliminary injunction (district court applied an overly strict evidentiary standard and improperly excluded hearsay), and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Title IX prohibits excluding transgender students from sex‑segregated restrooms | Title IX discrimination “on the basis of sex” includes discrimination based on transgender status/gender identity; OCR interpretation requires treating transgender students consistent with gender identity | Title IX and §106.33 permit separation on the basis of biological sex; schools may limit facilities by "biological gender" and offer single‑stall alternatives | OCR’s interpretation of §106.33 is entitled to Auer deference; dismissal of Title IX claim reversed |
| Whether the regulation 34 C.F.R. §106.33 is ambiguous as applied to transgender students | The regulation is ambiguous about which definition of “students of one sex” governs transgender students; agency interpretation resolves ambiguity | The regulation plainly contemplates biological (anatomical) sex and is not ambiguous | Court: regulation ambiguous as applied to transgender individuals; agency’s view is reasonable and not plainly erroneous |
| Whether the district court properly declined to afford deference to OCR’s interpretation | OCR’s view reflects fair and considered agency judgment and consistent enforcement; merits controlling weight under Auer | OCR’s letter is a novel or litigating‑position interpretation inconsistent with regulation | Court: Auer deference appropriate; OCR’s interpretation stands unless plainly erroneous (it is not) |
| Whether the district court properly denied preliminary injunction | G.G. showed likelihood of success and irreparable harm; district court misapplied evidentiary standards and improperly excluded hearsay and affidavits | Board argued privacy harms to other students and that single‑stall restrooms mitigate any burden; district court found balance of hardships against G.G. | Court vacated denial of injunction because district court used incorrect evidentiary standard for preliminary injunctions and abused discretion; remanded for reconsideration under correct standard |
Key Cases Cited
- Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997) (agency’s interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation receives controlling weight unless plainly erroneous)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (framework for judicial deference to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard for plausibility on a motion to dismiss)
- Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390 (1981) (preliminary injunctions may rely on less formal evidence than at trial)
- Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (discrimination based on sex stereotypes actionable under federal law)
- Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011) (discrimination against transgender person is sex‑based for purposes of analogous law)
- Morris v. Wachovia Sec., 448 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 2006) (standard for abuse of discretion review of preliminary injunction decisions)