G.D. v. Kenny, 15 A.3d 300

G.D. had a 1993 conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine and was sentenced to five years; the expungement order in 2006 declared the arrest and conviction as records to be sealed, with limited disclosure allowed by statute.
Campaign developers Shaftan and Mountaintop Media created flyers alleging G.D. was a drug dealer who went to jail near a public school, disseminated by the Hudson County Democratic Organization in 2007.
G.D. sued for defamation, privacy, and related torts against Kenny, the Hudson County Democratic Organization, and individuals/companies involved in creating and distributing the flyers; defendants moved for summary judgment arguing truth as a defense and substantial accuracy of the statements.
The trial court stayed discovery initially and did not grant summary judgment; the Appellate Division later granted summary judgment to defendants, holding expungement does not render true statements false for defamation and that the information remained substantially accurate.
The Supreme Court granted certification to decide whether expunged conviction information can be truthfully reported as a defense to defamation and whether expungement creates a privacy interest that would bar publication of expunged information.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does expungement negate truth as a defense in defamation?	G.D. argues expungement renders the conviction a non-event and falsifies statements, so truth cannot be a defense.	Defendants contend truth remains a defense and expungement does not erase historical facts used in reporting.	No; truth remains a defense despite expungement.
Are the flyers substantially accurate or false as to G.D.'s conduct?	G.D. argues key facts (selling near a school, five-year jail term) are false or inaccurate.	Flyers provided substantial truth and fair characterizations given public records and context.	Flyers were substantially accurate; not defamatory as false.
Does expungement create a reasonable expectation of privacy in expunged records?	Expunged records should not allow publishers to disclose private facts long in the public domain.	Expungement does not erase public facts or create a privacy right against truthful reporting.	No reasonable expectation of privacy; expungement does not bar publication in this context.
Should other privacy-tort claims be allowed where defamation is not actionable?	Privacy torts should be recognized when expunged information is published.	Privacy torts fail where statements are true or substantially accurate and concern public issues.	Privacy tort claims fail when statements are true or substantially accurate and pertain to public concerns.

Ward v. Zelikovsky, 136 N.J.516 (N.J. 1994) (defamation balance with free-speech protections; truth as defense)
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496 (U.S. 1991) (substantial truth standard for defamation; minor inaccuracies allowed)
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (U.S. 1964) (actual malice standard for public-figure defamation cases)
Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (U.S. 1979) (government may publish truthful information lawfully obtained; juvenile-delinquent names case)
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1976) (protects robust political discourse; free-speech considerations in campaigns)
Romaine v. Kallinger, 109 N.J. 282 (N.J. 1988) (defamation; fair-report and substantial truth considerations in reporting public records)
DeAngelis v. Hill, 180 N.J. 1 (N.J. 2004) (defamation standard and appropriate defenses in New Jersey)
E.A. v. New Jersey Real Estate Commission, 208 N.J. Super. 65 (N.J. App. Div. 1986) (expungement-related agency records and access; limits of expungement scope)
State v. J.R.S., 398 N.J. Super. 1 (N.J. App. Div. 2008) (expunged records may be accessed for limited purposes during litigation)