Fuentes v. State, 164 A.3d 265

Background

Defendant Miguel Fuentes, longtime coworker of Ms. R. at a Marriott, was convicted by a jury of second-degree rape and third-degree sexual offense for sexual activity with Ms. R.; paternity testing tied him to the resulting child.
The State alleged Ms. R. was deaf and a “mentally defective individual” under Md. Crim. Law § 3-301, rendering her incapable of consenting; most proof of her deficits was lay testimony and the jury’s observation of her testimony via interpreters.
Fuentes admitted sexual contact but claimed the acts were consensual and initiated by Ms. R.; he also had a long (14+ year) working relationship with her.
Trial rulings at issue: (1) no requirement that the State produce medical/expert diagnosis to prove “mentally defective,” (2) prosecutor’s rebuttal comment referring to an unadmitted statement (alleged admission by Fuentes) during closing, and (3) exclusion of ~300 pages of Ms. R.’s Marriott employment records.
Lower appellate court affirmed; Maryland Court of Appeals granted certiorari and affirmed the convictions, holding (a) medical diagnosis not required, (b) prosecutor’s improper closing remark was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and (c) exclusion of employment records was proper as irrelevant.

Issues

Issue	Petitioner (Fuentes) Argument	State Argument	Held
Sufficiency — must the State present medical/diagnostic evidence to prove a victim is a “mentally defective individual” under Crim. Law § 3-301(b)?	A medical diagnosis is required; terms like “mental retardation” and “mental disorder” are clinical and must be proven by expert/medical evidence.	Statute does not incorporate definitions from other code titles; lay testimony and jury observation can prove incapacity; expert evidence not required.	Medical diagnosis not required; lay testimony and jury observation can suffice to show victim meets statutory definition.
Prosecutorial remark — was it reversible error to reference Fuentes’ alleged admission (unadmitted interview statement) in rebuttal closing?	The remark referenced facts not in evidence and unfairly prejudiced Fuentes.	The jury could disbelieve Fuentes’ denials and infer scienter; the remark was supported by in-court testimony and reasonable inferences.	The remark was improper but harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the strength of other evidence of incapacity and the jury instruction to rely on evidence.
Exclusion of employment records — were Ms. R.’s Marriott personnel files relevant and admissible to rebut incapacity?	The records tend to show communication, job competence, and some literacy — directly bears on whether she could appraise, resist, or communicate unwillingness.	The records are several inferential steps removed from statutory incapacity elements and thus irrelevant.	Records were properly excluded as irrelevant; they would not have made the statutory incapacity more or less probable.
Standard of review for relevance ruling	(implicit) de novo review of legal relevance	(implicit) trial court discretion/abuse-of-discretion	The Court notes relevance is a legal question reviewed de novo and finds the exclusion legally correct.

Key Cases Cited

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (establishes the legal-sufficiency standard for criminal convictions)
McKenzie v. State, 962 A.2d 998 (Md. 2008) (application of Jackson standard in Maryland)
Rendelman v. State, 947 A.2d 546 (Md. 2008) (appellate deference to jury credibility assessments)
Travis v. State, 98 A.3d 281 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2014) (discussing automatic establishment of lack of consent when victim is legally incompetent)
Spain v. State, 872 A.2d 25 (Md. 2005) (limitations on prosecutor argument; jury instruction mitigating improper argument)
Dorsey v. State, 350 A.2d 665 (Md. 1976) (harmless-error standard: State must show beyond a reasonable doubt that error did not contribute to verdict)
Simpson v. State, 112 A.3d 941 (Md. 2015) (reiteration of harmless-error review and factors to assess prejudice)