935 F.3d 752
9th Cir.2019Background
- FTC sued Qualcomm alleging antitrust violations tied to licensing of standard-essential patents (SEPs) and sales of CDMA and premium LTE modem chips.
- Allegations: Qualcomm refused to license SEPs to rival chip suppliers, conditioned chip sales on customers having Qualcomm patent licenses, and charged per-handset royalties that effectively taxed competitor chips.
- After a 10-day trial the district court found Qualcomm violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 5 of the FTC Act, and issued a multipart permanent injunction requiring exhaustive SEP licenses for modem-chip suppliers and prohibiting conditioning chip sales on license status.
- Qualcomm appealed and moved for a partial stay of the injunction pending appeal, seeking to block the requirements to (1) make exhaustive SEP licenses available to competitors and (2) stop conditioning chip sales on patent-license status and renegotiate licenses.
- The Ninth Circuit granted a partial stay, finding serious questions on the merits (particularly the asserted antitrust duty to deal and the per-handset royalty theory), a likelihood of irreparable harm from large-scale business disruptions, and that the balance of equities/public interest favored a stay given divided government views.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Qualcomm had an antitrust duty to license SEPs to rival chip suppliers | FTC: Qualcomm’s refusal to license SEPs to chip rivals violated antitrust law and commitments to standards bodies, harming competition | Qualcomm: No general duty to deal; Trinko/Colgate principle allows refusal to deal absent narrow Aspen Skiing–type abandonment of profitable course of dealing | Court: Serious questions exist as to duty-to-deal theory; stay granted on injunction requiring exhaustive SEP licenses |
| Whether per-handset royalty structure unlawfully imposed an exclusionary surcharge on rival chips | FTC: Royalties assessed per handset (not per chip) functioned as an exclusionary surcharge disadvantaging rivals | Qualcomm: Per-handset royalty practice is lawful; absent refusal to deal or below-cost pricing, tying/leverage claim fails | Court: Qualcomm raised a fair prospect of success; serious questions on this theory; stay granted as to royalty/conditioning provisions |
| Whether irreparable harm justified stay pending appeal | FTC: Public interest in competition and consumers counsels against delay | Qualcomm: Injunction forces large-scale contract renegotiations and business-structural change that cannot be undone on appeal | Court: Qualcomm showed likelihood of irreparable harm from compelled contractual changes; factor favors stay |
| Balance of equities/public interest | FTC: Injunction protects competition and consumers | Qualcomm + some federal agencies (DoD, DOE, DOJ disagreeing with FTC): injunction may harm consumers/national security; government not united | Court: Because government views are divided and equities favor avoiding disruptive, possibly unlawful change, balance favors stay |
Key Cases Cited
- Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004) (Sherman Act generally does not impose a duty to deal; duty-to-deal exception narrow)
- Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985) (duty-to-deal found where monopolist abandoned profitable course of dealing to exclude competition)
- Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009) (stay factors: likelihood of success, irreparable harm, balance of equities, public interest)
- Colgate & Co. v. United States, 250 U.S. 300 (1919) (private refusal to deal generally permissible under Sherman Act)
- Lair v. Bullock, 697 F.3d 1200 (9th Cir. 2012) (standard for showing serious questions on the merits for stay)
- Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2011) (applicant need not show more-likely-than-not success; fair prospect or serious questions suffice)
- Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183 (2010) (stay/standard discussions cited)
- Doe v. Abbott Labs., 571 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2009) (monopoly-leveraging pricing claims require refusal to deal or exclusionary conduct in monopoly market)
- NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 463 U.S. 1311 (1983) (equities may favor stay where injunction would nullify ongoing contracts and cause irreparable business harm)
- Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2009) (irreparable harm where compliance would force plaintiffs into untenable business choices)
- Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy, Inc. v. NRC, 479 U.S. 1313 (1986) (stay preserves status quo pending appeal)
