900 N.W.2d 162
Minn.2017Background
- Employee James Friedlander alleged he reported his employer Edwards Lifesciences to supervisors about alleged unlawful conduct and was subsequently terminated.
- Those Friedlander told already knew of the allegedly unlawful conduct.
- Friedlander sued in federal court under the Minnesota Whistleblower Act (MWA), claiming wrongful termination for reporting violations.
- Edwards moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing Friedlander did not “blow the whistle” because he reported only to persons who already knew the conduct, relying on Obst v. Microtron.
- The central statutory question arose from a 2013 MWA amendment defining “good faith” as “conduct that does not violate section 181.932, subdivision 3,” i.e., excluding knowingly false or recklessly false reports.
- The federal court certified the question whether the 2013 amendment eliminated the judicial requirement (from Obst/Kidwell) that a whistleblower act with the purpose of “exposing an illegality.”
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 2013 amendment eliminated Obst’s judicially created requirement that a whistleblower act to "expose an illegality" | Friedlander: The legislative definition of “good faith” replaced judicial gloss; courts must apply the new statutory definition (no purpose requirement). | Edwards Lifesciences: The amendment supplements Obst; Obst’s purpose-based test remains unless the statute expressly or necessarily contradicts it. | The amendment abrogated Obst’s purpose requirement; “good faith” now means reports not knowingly false or made in reckless disregard of the truth. |
Key Cases Cited
- Obst v. Microtron, Inc., 614 N.W.2d 196 (Minn. 2000) (adopted a two-part “good faith” test requiring report content and reporter’s purpose to expose illegality)
- Kidwell v. Sybaritic, Inc., 784 N.W.2d 220 (Minn. 2010) (reaffirmed Obst’s purpose-based definition of good faith)
- Karl v. Uptown Drink, LLC, 835 N.W.2d 14 (Minn. 2013) (explains that judicial statutory interpretation becomes part of the statute)
- Wilson v. Mortg. Res. Ctr., Inc., 888 N.W.2d 452 (Minn. 2016) (statutory definitions are exclusive and displace incompatible common-law standards)
- Braylock v. Jesson, 819 N.W.2d 585 (Minn. 2012) (presumption that Legislature intends a change in law when it amends a statute)
- Herrly v. Muzik, 374 N.W.2d 275 (Minn. 1985) (discusses limits on judicially created bars to recovery in statutory contexts)
- K.R. v. Sanford, 605 N.W.2d 387 (Minn. 2000) (addresses when a legislative amendment controls over a prior judicial rule)