Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP and Richard A. Wolfe v. Millennium Chemicals Inc., Millennium America Holdings, LLC and Millennium Holdings, LLC
05-16-01132-CV
| Tex. App. | Jul 31, 2017Background
- Millennium (NJ/Houston-based) sued Fried Frank and partner Richard Wolfe alleging fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference, conspiracy, and legal malpractice arising from Wolfe’s role drafting a 1996 tax‑sharing agreement and later representing Hanson (Millennium’s former parent) in IRS audits and appeals.
- Millennium alleges Wolfe advised Millennium, then later represented Hanson and orchestrated a cover‑up (including ghostwritten Texas communications and a June 2010 IRS meeting in Dallas) to avoid paying Millennium a ~$65M tax benefit.
- Millennium moved its operations to Houston (2004); Hanson moved headquarters to Dallas (2006).
- Defendants filed a verified special appearance asserting lack of personal jurisdiction (and argued attorney‑immunity), submitting evidence (including Wolfe affidavit denying Texas‑based legal services). Plaintiffs responded with deposition excerpts, IRS meeting minutes, emails, and arbitration testimony.
- The trial court denied the special appearance. Defendants appealed; the Court of Appeals reviews de novo but draws factual inferences for the trial court where appropriate.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Texas has specific jurisdiction over nonresident attorneys for alleged torts | Wolfe (and Fried Frank) purposefully availed themselves: (1) Wolfe attended a June 2010 Dallas IRS meeting where he acted adverse to Millennium; (2) he ‘‘virtually’’ controlled Hanson’s Texas reps (ghostwritten emails); and (3) he repeatedly communicated with Texas residents | Wolfe negated jurisdictional allegations via affidavit and testimony: he did not practice or perform TBA‑related legal services in Texas, and his deposition does not establish specific tortious acts in Texas | Specific jurisdiction not established; contacts were insufficiently connected to the operative facts; special appearance should have been granted (reversed and rendered) |
| Whether telephonic/email communications and direction of Texas‑based agents create jurisdiction ("virtual presence" / "directed‑a‑tort") | Repeated emails, calls, and instructions to Hutchinson (Dallas) show Wolfe induced torts in Texas and was ‘‘effectively there’’ | Communications alone (and advising or directing a client who moved to Texas) are insufficient; the Texas Supreme Court rejected a directed‑a‑tort theory for jurisdiction | Held insufficient: virtual‑presence and directed‑a‑tort theories fail to establish purposeful availment or relatedness |
| Whether a single in‑state meeting (June 2010) supplied the substantial‑connection prong | The Dallas IRS meeting resolved key issues and thus is substantially connected to plaintiffs’ operative facts | Meeting attendance alone, and Wolfe’s lack of recall about specific topics, do not demonstrate he withheld or took adverse positions tied to Millennium’s operative claims | Held insufficient: no evidence the June 2010 meeting had the requisite substantial connection to prove defendants’ liability |
| Whether combining multiple limited contacts (visit + communications + inducement) satisfies due process | The aggregate of Wolfe’s lone Texas visit, numerous communications, and induced Texas acts shows purposeful availment | No authority supports aggregating these insufficient contacts to create jurisdiction; defendants negated plaintiff’s pleaded basis | Held insufficient: aggregation of contacts did not meet minimum‑contacts or relatedness requirements |
Key Cases Cited
- Kelly v. Gen. Interior Constr., Inc., 301 S.W.3d 653 (Tex. 2010) (burden‑shifting rules for special appearances)
- Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569 (Tex. 2007) (breadth of Texas long‑arm and federal due‑process limits)
- Ahrens & DeAngeli, P.L.L.C. v. Flinn, 318 S.W.3d 474 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010) (phone/email contacts generally insufficient for purposeful availment)
- Searcy v. Parex Res., Inc., 496 S.W.3d 58 (Tex. 2016) (rejecting the directed‑a‑tort theory for jurisdiction and requiring substantial connection to operative facts)
- Moncrief Oil Int’l, Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 414 S.W.3d 142 (Tex. 2013) (analysis of purposeful availment where defendants attended Texas meetings)
- Hotel Partners v. Craig, 993 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994) (jurisdictional precedent regarding nonresident attorneys)
- Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777 (Tex. 2005) (purposeful availment standards and importance of defendant’s acts)
