992 F.3d 391
5th Cir.2021Background
- This long-running consent-decree case concerns Texas’s implementation of Medicaid’s EPSDT program; in 2007 the parties agreed to corrective-action orders (CAOs), including a “Lagging Counties” CAO requiring county-by-county data collection and a conference period followed by possible court intervention.
- Parties failed to agree after the CAO conference; plaintiffs moved for further court action on the Lagging Counties CAO and defendants moved to eliminate parts of it; the district court denied plaintiffs’ motion and granted defendants’.
- Plaintiffs are overall “prevailing parties” and sought attorneys’ fees; parties settled some fees but disputed fees for work on the unsuccessful Lagging Counties motions.
- After this court held plaintiffs were entitled to an entitlement-to-fees determination but remanded for a Hensley reasonableness analysis, the district court on remand denied all fees for the Lagging Counties work (April 7, 2020).
- Plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider on day 30 (May 7) and later filed a notice of appeal (Aug 13). The Fifth Circuit held the appeal of the April 7 order untimely and dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction, but it reviewed and affirmed the district court’s July 23 denial of the reconsideration motion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness/jurisdiction to appeal April 7 fee denial | May 7 motion tolled the 30-day appeal period so appeal is timely | May 7 motion was filed after applicable Rule deadlines and did not toll appeal period | Appeal of April 7 order dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; May 7 motion did not toll under Rule 4(a)(4) |
| Proper characterization of May 7 postjudgment motion | District court could treat motion as Rule 54(b) or Rule 59(e) reconsideration | Motion was untimely for Rule 59 and Rule 54(d); should be treated as Rule 60(b) | Rule 59(e) was the proper mechanism but the motion was untimely and should be treated as Rule 60(b); district court’s use of Rule 54(b) was erroneous but harmless |
| Entitlement to fees for Lagging Counties motions | As prevailing parties on the consent decree/CAOs, plaintiffs are entitled to fees for CAO-anticipated work | Plaintiffs were unsuccessful on the Lagging Counties motions and thus not entitled to fees for that work | On remand district court denied all fees under Hensley; that underlying denial cannot be reviewed here (dismissed as untimely), and denial of reconsideration is affirmed (no reversible error) |
| Standard/remedy on reconsideration | Remand for proper Rule 60(b) analysis or reversal of denial | District court’s application of Rule 59 principles was sufficient; no remand needed | Abuse-of-discretion review; because district court applied Rule 59(e) guiding principles (a lower threshold) and plaintiffs couldn’t prevail there, affirmance without remand was appropriate |
Key Cases Cited
- Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983) (reasonableness analysis for attorney’s fees)
- Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007) (statutory appeal deadlines are jurisdictional)
- Browder v. Dep’t of Corr. of Ill., 434 U.S. 257 (1978) (appeal from denial of Rule 60(b) relief does not bring up the underlying judgment)
- Halicki v. La. Casino Cruises, Inc., 151 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 1998) (reconsideration motions treated under Rule 59 or Rule 60 depending on timing)
- Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1990) (Rule 59(e) vs. Rule 60(b) standards; Rule 60(b) is more exacting)
- Williams v. Seidenbach, 958 F.3d 341 (5th Cir. 2020) (Rule 54(b) permits revision of nonfinal orders)
- Morgan v. Chapman, 969 F.3d 238 (5th Cir. 2020) (futility/efficiency may obviate remand)
- Ford v. Elsbury, 32 F.3d 931 (5th Cir. 1994) (timing determines whether a motion is treated under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b))