927 F.3d 961
7th Cir.2019Background
- Freeman, an African-American employee hired May 2015 as a treatment-plant operator, was a probationary at-will worker during his first year.
- Three months after hire he was arrested for DUI, his driver’s license was suspended for six months, and he began substance-abuse counseling; he informed the District of these facts.
- His job typically used District vehicles but did not require a driver’s license; Freeman proposed accommodations (bike and cooler, a John Deere go-cart, or an occupational driving permit) to perform duties without a full license.
- The District refused to approve the occupational permit and terminated Freeman during probation for “unsatisfactory performance.” Freeman alleges the real reasons were race and perceived alcoholism.
- Freeman sued under § 1981, § 1983, Title VII, and the ADA alleging race discrimination, disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, retaliation, and a Monell policy claim. The district court dismissed with prejudice for failure to state claims; Freeman appealed pro se.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Race discrimination under § 1983 / Title VII | District fired Freeman because he is African‑American | Freeman failed to plead comparator/co-worker treated better | Complaint sufficiently alleged race-based firing; comparator pleading not required at motion-to-dismiss stage (vacated dismissal) |
| Disability discrimination under ADA (including perceived disability) | District regarded Freeman as alcoholic and fired him despite proposed accommodations | Freeman did not plead alcoholism substantially limits a major life activity | Allegations that District regarded him as alcoholic and that job duties (moving items) could be a major life activity are sufficient to survive dismissal |
| Failure to accommodate / Retaliation under ADA | Freeman requested accommodations and was fired after doing so | District contends requests related only to license suspension, not disability | Allegations that Freeman requested accommodations and was fired because of disability/requests state plausible accommodation and retaliation claims |
| Monell municipal‑policy claim | Freeman alleges District disproportionately fires probationary African‑American employees (policy caused discharge) | Complaint failed to specify whether claim alleges disparate treatment (intent) or disparate impact | Monell claim dismissed without leave to amend: Freeman had multiple chances and did not plead whether intent or impact theory was alleged (affirmed) |
Key Cases Cited
- Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability requires a policy, custom, or final‑decisionmaker causing the constitutional violation)
- Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002) (notice pleading suffices for employment discrimination complaints)
- Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074 (7th Cir. 2008) (plaintiff need only plead facts giving rise to an inference of discrimination at pleading stage)
- Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516 (7th Cir. 1998) (simple allegations of race discrimination can meet Rule 8 notice pleading)
- Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (federal courts apply liberal notice‑pleading standards)
- Tate v. SCR Medical Transportation, 809 F.3d 343 (7th Cir. 2015) (ADA plaintiff must allege disability and ability to perform essential job functions with or without accommodation)
- Miller v. Illinois Dept. of Transp., 643 F.3d 190 (7th Cir. 2011) (breadth of job‑related activities can inform major‑life‑activity analysis)
- Gogos v. AMS Mech. Sys., Inc., 737 F.3d 1170 (7th Cir. 2013) (standards for ADA failure‑to‑accommodate and retaliation claims)
- Despears v. Milwaukee County, 63 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 1995) (license suspension may be a lawful basis for action when not caused by disability)
- Spiegel v. McClintic, 916 F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 2019) (Monell pleading requires linking municipal action to constitutional harm)
- Campbell v. Forest Preserve Dist. of Cook County, 752 F.3d 665 (7th Cir. 2014) (§ 1981 claims against public bodies require Monell allegations)
- Lewis v. City of Chicago, 560 U.S. 205 (2010) (disparate‑treatment requires intent; disparate‑impact does not)
- Lee v. Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter R.R., 912 F.3d 1049 (7th Cir. 2019) (leave to amend not required when plaintiff repeatedly fails to cure pleading defects)