Freedom From Religion Foundation Inc. v. New Kensington Arnold School District
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 14594
3rd Cir.2016Background
- In 1956 a private fraternal organization donated a granite Ten Commandments monument placed on Valley High School campus; it sits near a gym entrance visible from paths and the road.
- Plaintiffs: Marie Schaub (mother), her daughter Doe 1, and Freedom From Religion Foundation (FFRF); they sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging the monument violates the Establishment Clause and sought injunctive and declaratory relief, nominal damages, and fees.
- Schaub lives in the district, had visited the high school a few times (karate event, pool, dropping off relatives), saw the monument, describes it as religious and unwelcome, and planned to drive Doe 1 to the high school (Doe 1 would attend in 2014).
- Doe 1 had sporadic past exposure as a child, testified she did not then read or feel offended; she later learned about the monument but record is unclear whether that was before filing.
- District Court granted summary judgment for the school district, finding plaintiffs lacked standing and that injunctive relief was moot; plaintiffs appealed.
- Third Circuit (lead opinion) held Schaub has standing for nominal damages and injunctive relief (not moot); Doe 1 lacks standing for nominal damages; remanded to determine FFRF's associational standing based on Schaub’s membership timing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing to bring Establishment Clause challenge to religious display | Direct, unwelcome contact with monument (even infrequent) suffices; Schaub and Doe 1 had such contact | Court below: standing requires frequent/regular, necessary contact; these plaintiffs lacked it | Direct, unwelcome contact suffices without a frequency requirement; Schaub has standing, Doe 1 does not for nominal damages |
| Standing for nominal (retrospective) damages | Nominal damages vindicate past injury from unwelcome contact; preserve claim | Nominal damages are insufficient alone to establish redressability/standing | Schaub: past unwelcome contact supports nominal damages claim (standing). Doe 1: no showing of unwelcome contact at filing -> no standing |
| Standing for prospective injunctive relief | Schaub (as parent) can seek injunction to protect daughter's future exposure; Schaub planned to drive Doe 1 to school | District: Schaub’s later decision to enroll Doe 1 elsewhere moots prospective relief; standing must exist at filing | Schaub has standing for injunctive relief; transfer does not moot her claim because relief could redress her interest and she may re-enroll Doe 1 |
| Organizational/associational standing of FFRF | FFRF asserts standing through Schaub as member | District: no standing because principal plaintiff lacked standing and/or Schaub was not a member at filing | Remanded to district court to determine whether Schaub was an FFRF member at filing and thus whether FFRF has standing |
Key Cases Cited
- Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) (standing and redressability rules; plaintiffs must show injury at commencement and that relief will redress it)
- Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United For Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982) (distinguishing generalized grievances from particularized standing)
- United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973) (small/technical injuries can suffice for standing)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (plaintiff’s burden to show standing and evidentiary standard at summary judgment)
- Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) (redressability is an independent standing requirement; relief must remedy the injury)
- Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (nominal damages are available for constitutional violations even without proof of actual injury)
- Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (parents have Article III standing to challenge school-sponsored religious practices affecting their children)
- Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (addressing constitutionality of religious displays; presence of unwelcome contact in public settings considered in standing context)
- County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (religious displays and Establishment Clause analysis)
- Morrison v. Board of Education of Boyd County, 521 F.3d 602 (6th Cir. 2008) (nominal damages alone may not redress past harm for standing/mootness purposes)