Fredericks v. United States Department of the Interior, Civil Action No. 2020-2458

John Fredericks Jr. (a Three Affiliated Tribes enrollee) died in 2006; the United States held 3,477 acres in trust and probated his trust estate under federal law.
In 2008 Kodiak Oil & Gas entered a lease for a 160-acre allotment; the Acting Fort Berthold Superintendent signed an "Acceptance of Lessor" form that the Bureau treated as executing/approving the lease for the decedent’s estate.
Probate proceedings (IBIA) held that Judy Fredericks, the surviving spouse, holds a life estate "without regard to waste" under AIPRA and that remaindermen (the decedent’s children) each hold remainder shares.
The Bureau’s Regional Director and the Interior Board of Indian Appeals upheld the lease execution and concluded that, under FBMLA + AIPRA, Judy (as life tenant without regard to waste) is entitled to all lease income during her lifetime.
Plaintiffs (five of John’s children) sued under the APA seeking review and moved for a preliminary injunction to stop distribution of lease proceeds to Judy; the District Court denied the injunction.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did the Superintendent’s signature on the "Acceptance of Lessor" execute the lease per FBMLA §1(a)(3)?	The Acceptance form only "accepted the bonus" and did not execute the lease; thus execution was improper.	The Acceptance form was commonly used to document consent and the Superintendent intended it to have the same effect as signing the lease.	Court: FBMLA silent on form; agency interpretation reasonable and entitled to deference; Plaintiffs unlikely to succeed.
Are holders of a life estate "without regard to waste" (AIPRA) "owners" under FBMLA for purposes of distributing lease proceeds?	"Owner" means remaindermen/mineral owners, not life tenants; life tenants should not receive mineral proceeds.	"Owner" is broad; AIPRA expressly entitles life tenants without regard to waste to all income (bonuses/royalties); agency has long treated life tenants as owners.	Court: Term "owner" ambiguous; agency reading (including life tenants) is reasonable under Chevron and will be upheld.
Are Plaintiffs entitled to a preliminary injunction to prevent distribution of lease proceeds pending review?	Absent injunction, proceeds may be dissipated and unrecoverable; irreparable harm.	Monetary harm is generally reparable; Plaintiffs have a pending Tucker Act claim in the Court of Federal Claims to recover funds.	Court: Plaintiffs failed to show likelihood of success, irreparable harm, or equities/public interest in their favor; injunction denied.

Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (standard for preliminary injunctions).
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (agency deference framework).
Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019) (limits and guidance on deference to agency interpretations of their regulations).
Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (context on federal trust obligations for Indian lands).
United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162 (2011) (DOI charged with administering Indian land statutes).
United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983) (Mitchell II) (trust duties and money-mandating sources for Tucker Act claims).
Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148 (2019) (substantial-evidence standard explained).
Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (purpose of preliminary injunction to preserve status quo).