Fred Dalton Brooks v. Deputy Warden William Powell
706 F. App'x 965
| 11th Cir. | 2017Background
- Plaintiff Fred Dalton Brooks, an inmate, sued Deputy Warden William Powell under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference after a post-assault hospital guard incident.
- Brooks alleged Powell refused to loosen waist chains, denied cleaning/diapers, and mocked him while he soiled himself during a multi-day hospital stay.
- Brooks filed pro se in 2012; Powell moved twice to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and did not assert PLRA exhaustion in either motion.
- This Court previously reversed dismissal on the merits, holding Brooks adequately alleged an Eighth Amendment claim and rejecting qualified-immunity dismissal.
- On remand, after years of litigation, Powell first raised the PLRA exhaustion defense in an answer and then in a Rule 12(c) motion; the district court accepted the defense and dismissed Brooks for failure to exhaust.
- The Eleventh Circuit majority reversed, holding Powell forfeited the exhaustion defense by failing to raise it in his earlier Rule 12 motions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(g)(2).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a defendant forfeits PLRA exhaustion defense by not raising it in initial Rule 12 motion | Brooks: Powell forfeited/waived the defense because he failed to raise it in his first Rule 12 motions | Powell: Defense may be raised later; exhaustion is like subject-matter jurisdiction and not forfeitable | Held: Forfeited — Rule 12(g)(2) bars raising exhaustion in later Rule 12 motion |
| Whether PLRA exhaustion is jurisdictional (affecting waiver) | Brooks: PLRA exhaustion is a non-jurisdictional claim-processing rule subject to forfeiture | Powell: Analogized exhaustion to jurisdiction so it cannot be waived | Held: Not jurisdictional — Supreme Court precedent confirms it is non-jurisdictional |
| Whether Rule 12(h)(2) or 12(h)(3) exceptions save the late defense | Brooks: Exceptions don’t apply — exhaustion is neither failure-to-state nor jurisdictional | Powell: District court treated exhaustion like subject-matter jurisdiction and thus not waived | Held: Neither exception applies; exhaustion is not a Rule 12(h)(2) failure-to-state defense nor a Rule 12(h)(3) jurisdictional challenge |
| Whether district court’s merits finding on exhaustion needs review | Brooks: Primary contention is procedural bar; merits unnecessary if defense forfeited | Powell: District court decided merits; dismissal justified on that basis | Held: Court resolved only procedural forfeiture under Rule 12(g)(2); did not reach merits of exhaustion |
Key Cases Cited
- Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007) (exhaustion is an affirmative defense, not a pleading requirement)
- Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368 (11th Cir. 2008) (procedural treatment of PLRA exhaustion and Rule 12 practice)
- Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006) (PLRA exhaustion is not jurisdictional)
- Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850 (2016) (exhaustion hinges on availability of administrative remedies)
- Union Pac. R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Engineers & Trainmen Gen. Comm. of Adjustment, Cent. Region, 558 U.S. 67 (2010) (distinguishes forfeitable claim-processing rules from nonforfeitable subject-matter jurisdiction)
- Brooks v. Warden, 800 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2015) (prior panel held Brooks adequately alleged Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference)