Fred Anderson, Jr. v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, 752 F.3d 881

Background

In 1999 Anderson robbed a bank in Mount Dora, Florida, shot two tellers (one fatally), was convicted of capital murder and related offenses, and the jury unanimously recommended death.
Trial counsel (two Assistant Public Defenders) used a detailed written Questionnaire, interviewed witnesses, and retained forensic psychologist Dr. Elizabeth McMahon about three weeks before trial; McMahon evaluated Anderson and found anxiety but no mitigating neuropsychological or abuse-related conditions.
During trial the defense “humanization” mitigation strategy presented ten lay witnesses; the jury recommended death and the judge followed with a death sentence, finding four aggravators and multiple nonstatutory mitigators.
Post-conviction counsel obtained evidence that Anderson had been sexually abused as a child by cousin Michael Green and retained experts (Villalba and Berland) who diagnosed PTSD, borderline personality, brain injury, and psychosis/dissociation linked to the abuse and asserted these would have been mitigating.
State post-conviction and Florida Supreme Court rejected Anderson’s Strickland ineffective-assistance claim, finding (1) Anderson repeatedly denied abuse so counsel reasonably did not uncover it, (2) Dr. McMahon had adequate time and performed a competent evaluation, and (3) even adding the new mitigation evidence there was no reasonable probability it would have changed the sentence.
Federal district court denied habeas relief under AEDPA; the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, applying Strickland deferentially and concluding the Florida Supreme Court’s adjudication was not an unreasonable application of federal law.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and present childhood sexual-abuse mitigation	Anderson: counsel unreasonably relied on his Questionnaire denials and therefore failed to discover cousin Michael Green’s sexual abuse and related mental-health mitigation	State: Anderson repeatedly denied abuse; counsel reasonably relied on Questionnaire, interviews, and expert evaluation; extensive mitigation investigation was performed	Held: No deficiency — counsel reasonably relied on defendant’s denials; failure to uncover abuse was not objectively unreasonable
Whether counsel was ineffective for retaining mental-health expert only ~3 weeks before trial and not supplying full background	Anderson: late retention and withholding of facts (abuse, head trauma, substance use) prevented a thorough evaluation that would have found brain injury, PTSD, borderline personality	State: Dr. McMahon conducted multiple sessions, full testing, and testified she had adequate time; additional experts’ opinions conflicted and were speculative; counsel’s timing and disclosures were reasonable	Held: No deficiency — timing and scope of expert work were reasonable and not constitutionally inadequate
Prejudice under Strickland: would undiscovered mitigation likely change outcome?	Anderson: evidence of prolonged childhood sexual abuse and resulting disorders would have produced reasonable probability of life sentence	State: aggravating evidence was overwhelming; expert opinions conflicted; remoteness and inconclusive psychiatric evidence make prejudice unlikely	Held: No prejudice — even assuming deficiency, added mitigation would not likely have led to a different result
Whether state courts unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent (AEDPA review)	Anderson: Florida Supreme Court misapplied Strickland as clarified in Williams/Wiggins/Rompilla/Porter and ABA Guidelines	State: those cases/guidelines are applications or guides to Strickland, not new rules; state court’s factual and legal conclusions were reasonable	Held: AEDPA deference applies; Florida Supreme Court’s Strickland adjudication was not unreasonable; federal habeas denied

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong test for ineffective assistance—performance and prejudice)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (application of Strickland to mitigation investigation and prejudice analysis)
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (counsel’s duty to investigate mitigation when records and red flags exist)
Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005) (counsel must review plainly available records when relevant to sentencing)
Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30 (2009) (prejudice analysis requires reweighing totality of mitigation against aggravation)
Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 U.S. 4 (2009) (ABA Guidelines are guides, not binding constitutional commands)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (AEDPA grants highly deferential standard to state-court decisions)