Franswa Shammam v. Daniel Paramo
664 F. App'x 629
| 9th Cir. | 2016Background
- Franswa Shammam was tried for a 1994 murder; after a mistrial he was convicted at a second trial in 2008 and sentenced to 25 years-to-life plus a 4-year firearm enhancement.
- There was a 14-year pre-indictment delay between the murder and indictment; Shammam moved three times to dismiss on due process grounds based on that delay; trial court denied each motion.
- On direct appeal the California Court of Appeal affirmed; Shammam then raised only the pre-indictment-delay/due-process claim in a federal § 2254 habeas petition, which the district court denied.
- The Ninth Circuit reviewed the California Court of Appeal’s last reasoned decision under AEDPA standards and considered whether that decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law or was an unreasonable factual determination.
- The state courts found the delay was justified by an open investigation and the prosecution’s good-faith choice not to charge earlier; the trial court found some prejudice (faded memories) but not enough to violate due process.
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding the state courts’ application of United States v. Lovasco and related precedent was not objectively unreasonable.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether considering offense seriousness in pre‑indictment delay analysis is contrary to Supreme Court law | Shammam: Court of Appeal improperly relied on seriousness of homicide when assessing due process | State: Lovasco allows flexible inquiry; seriousness may be considered among factors | Held: No clearly established Supreme Court rule forbids considering seriousness; not contrary to Lovasco |
| Whether the Court of Appeal unreasonably found delay justified by ongoing investigation despite lack of evidence of continuous activity | Shammam: Record shows no active investigation 1996–2008, so finding is unsupported | State: Court of Appeal assumed arguendo inactivity but found justification in prosecutor’s good‑faith decision to defer prosecution | Held: Not an unreasonable factual determination; Shammam did not dispute the good‑faith finding |
| Whether the Court of Appeal unreasonably applied Lovasco’s balancing test given minimal investigative activity and prejudice to defendant | Shammam: Minimal justification + faded memories and lost impeachment evidence required dismissal | State: Lovasco permits investigative delay even if some prejudice exists; prosecution acted without bad faith | Held: Application was not objectively unreasonable under AEDPA; prejudice was not enough to show due process violation |
| Standard of review under AEDPA for § 2254 habeas of state-court denial | Shammam: (implicit) state decision violated clearly established law or was unreasonable | State: AEDPA requires deference; reversal only for contrary/unreasonable application or unreasonable fact finding | Held: AEDPA standards applied; no grounds for relief under § 2254(d) |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (Sup. Ct.) (establishes limited due process role for pre‑indictment delay and instructs balancing reasons for delay against prejudice)
- Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (Sup. Ct.) (requires state-court error under AEDPA to be objectively unreasonable, not just incorrect)
- Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943 (9th Cir.) ( Ninth Circuit reviews district court denials of habeas de novo )
- Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911 (9th Cir.) (directs review of the state court’s last reasoned decision under § 2254)
- Milke v. Ryan, 711 F.3d 998 (9th Cir.) (explains when a state court’s factual finding is an unreasonable determination of the facts)