Franklin v. Eaves
337 Ga. App. 292
| Ga. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Franklin, a Fulton County health-department employee, filed a verified whistleblower suit alleging retaliation after she complained that moving to a cubicle exposed protected health information; she sued on Oct. 11, 2013.
- After an amended complaint substituting County Chairman Eaves, the case was removed to federal court and remanded Jan. 3, 2014; the remand order was not docketed in state court until March 14, 2014.
- The County filed answers on March 25, 2014 and concurrently moved to open a prejudgment default and later moved for summary judgment; the trial court opened the default and ultimately granted summary judgment for the County.
- The County argued the suit was time-barred under the Georgia Whistleblower Act (OCGA § 45-1-4) because earlier adverse employment acts (e.g., reassignment to a cubicle or reassignment of duties in Aug./Oct. 2012) triggered the limitations period.
- Franklin contended her cause accrued later (Oct. 24, 2012 meeting notifying her of duty reassignments) and identified other discrete retaliatory acts within one year of filing (denied training invite, denied/ignored leave requests, exigency over volunteer excuse).
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order opening default but reversed summary judgment, finding genuine factual disputes about when discrete retaliatory acts were discovered and that the County failed to prove timeliness as a matter of law.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Motion to open default under OCGA § 9-11-55(b) | County acted diligently after remand; default should be opened | County’s answer was tardy; opening default improper | Court affirmed opening default — no abuse of discretion (County monitored docket and acted promptly) |
| Whether suit was time-barred under the Georgia Whistleblower Act | Franklin: limitations ran Oct. 24, 2012 (when told duties had been reassigned) or later for other discrete acts; suit filed within one year | County: accrual began earlier (Aug. 27 or March 2012), so suit untimely | Reversed grant of summary judgment on timeliness — genuine disputes of material fact exist; County failed to prove suit untimely as matter of law |
| Waiver of challenge to § 9-11-55(b) oath/verification requirement | Franklin argued on appeal that pleadings weren’t under oath so prerequisites not met | County relied on motion and counsel affidavit asserting prompt action | Court declined to consider waivered argument; Franklin failed to raise it below, so issue waived |
| Appropriateness of summary judgment on alternate merits (prima facie Whistleblower Act claim) | Franklin argued disputed facts preclude summary judgment on merits | County argued plaintiff couldn’t establish prima facie case | Court did not decide merits; reversed based only on timeliness error and left merits for remand |
Key Cases Cited
- Brazell v. J. K. Boatwright & Co., P.C., 324 Ga. App. 502 (2013) (standards and prerequisites for opening prejudgment default)
- Cavender v. Taylor, 285 Ga. 724 (2009) (mandatory compliance with § 9-11-55(b) prerequisites)
- Cardinal Robotics, Inc. v. Moody, 287 Ga. 18 (2010) (limits on trial court discretion when opening default)
- Thomas v. Brown, 308 Ga. App. 514 (2011) (factors courts consider in deciding to open default)
- Home Builders Assn. of Savannah v. Chatham County, 276 Ga. 243 (2003) (summary judgment de novo review; construing evidence for nonmovant)
- Kerr v. Cohen, 249 Ga. App. 392 (2001) (verified complaint treated like affidavit for summary judgment purposes but not if conclusory)
- Nguyen v. Southwestern Emergency Physicians, P.C., 298 Ga. 75 (2015) (crediting nonmovant credibility on summary judgment)
- Cleaveland v. Gannon, 284 Ga. 376 (2008) (statute-of-limitations as affirmative defense burden on defendant)
- Porex Corp. v. Haldopoulos, 284 Ga. App. 510 (2007) (defendant must produce evidence proving statute-of-limitations defense on summary judgment)
- Pfeiffer v. Ga. Dep’t of Transp., 275 Ga. 827 (2002) (each party must present its best case on summary judgment)
- Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002) (discrete acts are assessed individually for timeliness under federal anti-discrimination law)