Frank Young v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, 697 F. App'x 660

Frank Young, a Florida state prisoner, filed a 2013 § 2254 petition challenging his 2010 convictions for armed burglary, aggravated assault, and throwing a deadly missile.
A magistrate judge found 12 of 13 claims unexhausted and procedurally defaulted (no available state remedy), and the remaining claim not cognizable; the district court adopted that recommendation and denied the petition.
Young did not appeal that district-court denial; he pursued state post-conviction relief, which was denied on state appeal.
In December 2015 Young filed a numerically second § 2254 petition challenging the same 2010 convictions and claims.
A magistrate judge recommended dismissal for lack of jurisdiction as an unauthorized second or successive petition; the district court adopted the recommendation and dismissed.
Young appealed; the Eleventh Circuit reviewed de novo and affirmed the dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Young's 2015 § 2254 petition was an unauthorized "second or successive" petition requiring prior appellate authorization	Young argued the district court erred in dismissing the numerically-second petition for lack of jurisdiction	The court (and respondent) argued the 2013 denial, based on unexcused procedural default, was an adjudication on the merits, making the 2015 filing a successive petition for which Young lacked appellate authorization	The court held the 2013 denial was a merits disposition on procedural-default grounds, so the 2015 petition was unauthorized second/successive and properly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction

Stewart v. United States, 646 F.3d 856 (11th Cir. 2011) (de novo review standard for successive determination)
Hubbard v. Campbell, 379 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2004) (district court lacks jurisdiction over unauthorized successive petitions)
Dunn v. Singletary, 168 F.3d 440 (11th Cir. 1999) (distinguishing dismissal without prejudice from adjudication on the merits)
Bailey v. Nagle, 172 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 1999) (futility doctrine for exhaustion and procedural default)
Henderson v. Lampert, 396 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2005) (procedural-default dismissal is a merits disposition making later petitions successive)
Graham v. Costello, 299 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2002) (distinguishing unexhausted claims from unexcused procedural default)
Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 370 (4th Cir. 2002) (procedural-default dismissal is on the merits)
In re Cook, 215 F.3d 606 (6th Cir. 2000) (same)
Bates v. Whitley, 19 F.3d 1066 (5th Cir. 1994) (pre-AEDPA view that procedural-default denials are merits determinations)
Hawkins v. Evans, 64 F.3d 543 (10th Cir. 1995) (same)
Shaw v. Delo, 971 F.2d 181 (8th Cir. 1992) (same)
Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521 (2011) (noting later abrogation of some circuit reasoning on other grounds)