Frank Williams, Jr. v. Lockheed Martin Corp, 958 F.3d 341

Background

Tarsia and Breck Williams sued multiple defendants after their father’s death from mesothelioma; after MDL proceedings, several defendants (including Taylor Seidenbach and McCarty) won summary judgment.
The Williamses moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a) to voluntarily dismiss the remaining defendants; the district court granted dismissals but did not state whether they were with or without prejudice.
A Fifth Circuit panel (Williams I) treated some dismissals as without prejudice and dismissed the appeal for lack of a § 1291 final decision.
The Williamses then obtained a Rule 54(b) partial final-judgment certification as to certain defendants and appealed; a subsequent panel (Williams II) held the district court lacked power to enter 54(b) and dismissed the appeal, prompting rehearing en banc.
En banc, the Fifth Circuit majority held that Rule 54(b) can authorize partial final judgments even when the plaintiff has previously dismissed remaining defendants under Rule 41(a), so appellate jurisdiction exists and the case returns to the merits panel.
The court emphasized that Rule 54(b) (and other procedural tools—Rule 15, Rule 21, or dismissals with prejudice) provides a means to avoid the so-called “finality trap.”

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a district court may enter Rule 54(b) certification after plaintiff voluntarily dismisses remaining defendants under Rule 41(a) without prejudice	Williams argued Rule 54(b) remains available and the court may direct entry of a partial final judgment to permit appeal of adjudicated defendants	Opposing view: a 41(a) dismissal ends the action (or leaves non-final dismissals), so a later 54(b) certification is improper	Held: Rule 54(b) can authorize partial final judgment in these circumstances; the order of events (dismissal then 54(b)) does not defeat 54(b) (Swope and ITOFCA support)
Whether Rule 41(a) permits voluntary dismissal of individual defendants (not the whole action)	Williams relied on Fifth Circuit precedent permitting dismissal of individual defendants under Rule 41(a)	Dissent argued textually Rule 41(a) refers to dismissal of an entire “action,” not discrete claims/defendants, so individual-defendant dismissals are invalid	Held: Court did not overrule circuit precedent that Rule 41(a) can dismiss individual defendants; but even if Rule 41(a) allows only whole-action dismissals, an invalid 41(a) dismissal would be a nullity and claims would remain pending—so 54(b) still valid
Does a voluntary dismissal without prejudice operate as a final decision for § 1291 purposes?	Williams: a 54(b) certification can make adjudicated rulings appealable notwithstanding remaining without-prejudice dismissals	Opponents: without-prejudice dismissals are ordinarily non-final and thus preclude § 1291 jurisdiction unless other steps taken	Held: The court avoided deciding the broader question; it accepted that Rule 54(b) is an adequate procedural path to create an appealable final judgment here
Whether precedent (Swope, ITOFCA) and Rule text permit the majority’s conclusion	Williams relied on Swope and ITOFCA as controlling/supportive precedent; argued the Rules must be followed to provide a pathway to appeal	Dissent argued those cases are distinguishable or dicta and that applying 54(b) after dismissal conflicts with Rule text and long-standing jurisdictional limits	Held: The majority treated Swope and ITOFCA as persuasive and consistent with Rule 54(b) text and Supreme Court guidance on rulemaking and finality; it rejected the dissent’s textual objections for purposes of this appeal

Key Cases Cited

Ryan v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 577 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1978) (voluntary dismissal without prejudice is not a final decision for § 1291)
Swope v. Columbian Chems. Co., 281 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 2002) (Rule 54(b) certification upheld where plaintiff moved to dismiss remaining claims and sought partial judgment)
ITOFCA, Inc. v. MegaTrans Logistics, Inc., 235 F.3d 360 (7th Cir. 2000) (Rule 54(b) is an adequate route to appellate jurisdiction in similar circumstances)
Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 137 S. Ct. 1702 (2017) (courts must respect Rulemaking process and final-judgment rule; limited avenues for interlocutory expansion)
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375 (1994) (courts of appeals have limited jurisdiction)
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990) (voluntary dismissal terminates the action and restricts district court powers post-dismissal)
Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1 (1980) (factors for evaluating the "no just reason for delay" requirement under Rule 54(b))
Exxon Corp. v. Md. Cas. Co., 599 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1979) (distinguishing dismissals of claims vs. dismissal of defendants)