Frank v. Shavers (In re City of Montgomery), 272 So. 3d 155

Background

On Nov. 15, 2013, Officer Charday Shavers, responding to an emergency dispatch, activated lights then siren and slowly proceeded from a stopped position through an intersection against a red light; Carlishia Frank, whose light was green, collided with the patrol car.
Dash‑cam video showed Shavers activated lights, 3–4 seconds later activated siren, then began a slow crossing; collision occurred about 4–5 seconds after Shavers began moving.
Shavers conceded she violated training by entering the farthest northbound lane without knowing it was stopped and the City found her "at fault."
Frank sued Shavers (individual and official capacities) and the City for negligence/wantonness and respondeat superior.
Shavers and the City moved for summary judgment asserting State‑agent immunity under Ala. Code § 6‑5‑338(a) and Cranman; the trial court denied the motion and the defendants petitioned for mandamus.
The Alabama Supreme Court reviewed dash‑cam evidence, applied the Cranman framework, and granted the writ directing the trial court to enter summary judgment for Shavers and the City.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Shavers is entitled to State‑agent immunity under § 6‑5‑338/Cranman	Frank: Shavers failed statutory conditions (did not "slow down as necessary" and lacked "due regard") so immunity not available	Shavers/City: Shavers was a peace officer performing discretionary law‑enforcement duties while using lights/siren; Cranman immunity applies	Court: Shavers met initial burden; dash‑cam shows compliance with signal/use and no reckless disregard; immunity applies
Whether violation of § 32‑5A‑7/32‑5A‑115 defeats immunity	Frank: Failure to slow and exercise due regard (and insufficient warning time) means officer violated those statutes and cannot claim immunity	Defendants: Statutes limit exercise of privileges but do not convert statutory duties into a negligence exception; immunity remains unless conduct is reckless/arbitrary	Court: Statutory conditions satisfied on evidence; statutes do not create negligence exception—only reckless, arbitrary, willful, malicious, etc., remove immunity
Whether Cranman exceptions apply (acts beyond authority, bad faith, willful/malicious)	Frank: Shavers acted beyond authority and contrary to training (insufficient time/failed to clear lane) so second Cranman exception applies	Defendants: Even assuming training violation, conduct was a discretionary law‑enforcement act and not willful, malicious, fraudulent, or in bad faith	Court: Frank produced no substantial evidence of willfulness, malice, bad faith, or acting beyond authority; Cranman exceptions do not apply
Whether City is liable under respondeat superior	Frank: City vicariously liable for officer's negligence/wantonness	City: If officer is immune, municipal immunity follows under vicarious‑liability principles	Court: Because Shavers immune, City also entitled to immunity and summary judgment

Key Cases Cited

Ex parte Cranman, 792 So.2d 392 (Ala. 2000) (articulating State‑agent immunity exceptions)
Ex parte Rizk, 791 So.2d 911 (Ala. 2000) (mandamus review of immunity‑based summary‑judgment denials)
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (videotape that blatantly contradicts plaintiff’s version can be accepted on summary judgment)
Blackwood v. City of Hanceville, 936 So.2d 495 (Ala. 2006) (officer conduct so unsafe may create genuine issue on reckless‑disregard exception)
Hollis v. City of Brighton, 950 So.2d 300 (Ala. 2006) (incorporating § 6‑5‑338 peace‑officer standard into Cranman)
City of Bayou La Batre v. Robinson, 785 So.2d 1128 (Ala. 2000) (municipal immunity follows employee immunity)
Ex parte Butts, 775 So.2d 173 (Ala. 2000) (adopting Cranman restatement)
Ex parte Moulton, 116 So.3d 1119 (Ala. 2013) (official‑capacity claims for money damages barred by State immunity)