Francois v. Elom, N15C-05-191 FWW

On May 15, 2014, Amanda Francois stepped off a public sidewalk onto defendant Lucinda Elom’s driveway and fell, injuring her right knee; she alleged the fall was caused by a crack in the driveway.
Francois filed suit on May 22, 2015, asserting negligence, failure to warn, failure to repair, and willful/wanton conduct by Elom; she sought damages for personal injuries and related losses.
Elom moved for summary judgment arguing Francois was a trespasser and, under 25 Del. C. § 1501, an owner is not liable to trespassers absent intentional conduct or willful/wanton disregard of the trespasser’s rights.
Elom denied knowledge of any dangerous condition, testified she had no complaints or prior notices about the driveway in 19 years of residence, and asserted she never had reason to believe a defect existed.
Francois did not contest trespass but argued Elom had been informed the driveway needed repair and that failure to fix was willful/wanton; at argument Francois conceded the record did not support that assertion.
The court considered whether the record contained evidence sufficient to show willful or wanton conduct and granted Elom’s motion for summary judgment.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether owner liable to trespasser under § 1501 for injuries from a driveway defect	Francois: Elom knew driveway needed repair and consciously failed to fix it, amounting to willful/wanton conduct	Elom: Francois was a trespasser; no knowledge, notice, or complaints about driveway; no conscious indifference	Court: No evidence of willful/wanton conduct; summary judgment for Elom
Whether evidence raises genuine issue of material fact on willful/wanton standard	Francois: Assertions of prior notice and failure to repair create triable issue	Elom: Testimony denies notice; record contains no supporting evidence	Court: Plaintiff conceded record lacks support; no material fact dispute exists

Bailey v. Pennington, 406 A.2d 44 (Del. 1979) (defines willful or wanton conduct as involving maliciousness and conscious realization of probable injury)
Merrill v. Crothall-Am., Inc., 606 A.2d 96 (Del. 1992) (summary judgment standard)
Moore v. Sizemore, 405 A.2d 679 (Del. 1979) (moving party’s initial burden on summary judgment)
Brzoska v. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355 (Del. 1995) (allocation of burdens at summary judgment)
Berns v. Doan, 961 A.2d 502 (Del. 2008) (premises guest statute reflects policy shielding owners from liability to unauthorized entrants)
Eustice v. Rupert, 460 A.2d 507 (Del. 1983) (description of wantonness as conscious indifference)