This is аn appeal from the entry of summary judgment against plaintiff-below Richard L. Merrill (“Merrill”). Merrill brought this action against Crothall-Ameri-can, ínc. (“Crothall”), his former employer, for wrongfully terminating his employment, claiming breach of contract, fraud and breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The Superior Court entered summary judgment against him on all counts, ruling that no material factual dispute existed on the record before it. We affirm that ruling as to the breach of contract and fraud counts. However, we hold that the record before the trial court posed a material issue of fact underlying Merrill’s claim of breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. We therefore reverse the Superior Court’s summary dis *98 position of Count III of Merrill’s complaint and remand the case to that court for further proceedings.
I
The discovery record in the trial court, viewed from a perspective which favors Merrill as the non-movant, reflects the following events.
In the summer of 1986, Merrill was working as a store manager for a marina in southern Delaware. Apparently dissatisfied with that position, he answered a help wanted advertisement appearing in the Wilmington News Journal in August of that year. The advertisemеnt was placed by Crothall and sought an individual, on a temporary basis, to aid in the development of a computerized preventive maintenance system. Merrill sent a background resume to the specified address.
In response to the resume, Crothall contacted Merrill and set up an interview for October 8. On that day Merrill arrived for the interview, completed an application for the tempоrary position and was interviewed by Charlie Collins, a Crothall employee. Their conversation lasted only fifteen to twenty minutes, however, after which Merrill was “taken across the hall” to speak with another Crothall employee, Bill Woomer (“Woomer”), about another position Crothall was attempting to fill. Unlike the advertised job this position was not temporary, but full-time. After meeting with Woomer, and later with Woоmer’s supervisor, Merrill was offered the full-time position in a telephone conversation on October 14, 1986. The proposed employment was that of Director of Plant Operations at King’s Harbor Care Center (“KHCC”), a Crothall client located in New York City.
Crothall is a contract service organization which provides facilities management for institutions such as schools and hospitals. One of the duties Crothall contracts to perform is the hiring of management personnel. These personnel, though working at the client’s facility, are in fact employees of Crothall. In the present case, the Superior Court found that Crothall had a contractual duty to provide KHCC, a health care facility, with a Director of Plant Operations by October 14, 1986, just six days after Merrill was first interviewed and the very day he was offered the рosition.
At the time of his interview with Woomer, Merrill expressed concern as to whether he was qualified for the KHCC position. Although he possesses a degree in chemical engineering and an MBA, Merrill had no experience in the health care field nor in plant maintenance. After being assured of adequate support and training, 1 however, Merrill accepted the position without visiting the site. The agreemеnt was formalized two weeks later by a letter from Woomer to Merrill dated October 29, 1986 and an employment contract between Crot-hall and Merrill dated October 27, 1986.
The relationship between Merrill and Crothall proved to be short-lived. Crothall claims that less than a month after Merrill accepted the position it began to receive complaints from KHCC about Merrill’s performance. At one point, Woomer wrote to Merrill citing some of his shortcomings, including lack of interpersonal and managerial skills and failure to develop a specific program. Woomer informed Merrill that his position was “tenuous.” On February 9, 1987, Crothall terminated Merrill’s employment, citing numerous problems with his performance.
II
Merrill claimed in the trial court that the reasons asserted by Crothall for his termination are not the actual bаsis for his release. He contended that, from the very beginning of their relationship, Crothall intended that Merrill remain in the position only until Crothall could find a more qualified candidate. He argued that he was merely a “warm body” who satisfied Crot-hall’s contractual duty to fill the Director’s position at KHCC by October 14,1986. He supported this assertion with documenta *99 tion purporting to show that Crothall interviewed the person who evеntually replaced him, John Blake, only two days after Merrill was offered the job. Furthermore, Merrill has produced an affidavit by K.C. Hoke, an award winning engineer employed by Crothall, which states, in part, that:
Mr. Woomer told me on several occasions that Dick Merrill was hired to fulfill the contract that was signed between Crothall-American and King’s Harbor Care Center, until someone else could be hired. Woomer also told me that Crot-hall-American needed someone immediately because the contract had already been signed.
On the strength of this evidence Merrill posits three distinct theories of recovery. He claims that his discharge breached his employment contract because the offer he accepted on October 14, 1986 was for a “permanent” position. His fraud count is based on Crothall’s false representation that his position would be “permanent” and that he would be adequately trained. Finally he asserts that by inducing Merrill to accept the position without informing him of its intent to replace him as soon as a “qualified” candidate could be obtained, Crothall acted in bad faith.
The Superior Court rejected all these claims. It reasoned that the only evidence Merrill had produced to support the permanent position representation were statements by Woomer made in February of 1987, well after the employment relationship had begun. It further noted that in his deposition Merrill admitted he knew from the very beginning that his employment could be terminated by Crothall at any time for any reason. Given this evidence, the court reasoned, Merrill had failed to make a showing that he could rebut the presumption under settled Delaware law that an employment contract is at-will. The trial court also ruled that this same knowledge of the indefinite nature of his employment precluded any assertion that Crothall fraudulently misled him to believe his employment was permanent.
In its grant of summary judgment, the Superior Court failed to address specifically the implied covenant claim. However, in its order denying certificatiоn of an interlocutory appeal to this Court, the Superior Court seemed to imply that there could be no breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing here because there could be no showing of fraud. After the remaining issues in the case were resolved, Merrill appealed to this Court.
Ill
This case comes from a trial court’s grant of summary judgment following review of what is, essentiаlly, a paper record. Applying the case dispositive provisions of Superior Court Civil Rule 56(c), the court ruled as a matter of law that Merrill was unable to prevail. This Court examines
de novo
questions of law decided by a lower court and we thus exercise plenary review.
Fiduciary Trust Co. v. Fiduciary Trust Co.,
Del.Supr.,
The purpose of summary judgment is to avoid the delay and expense of a trial where the ultimate fact finder, whether judge or jury, has nothing to decide. 6 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.04[1] (1992). Thus, entry of summary judgment is proper only where there are no material factual disputes.
Moore v. Sizemore,
Del.Supr.,
The role of a trial court when faced with a motion for summаry judgment is to identify disputed factual issues whose resolution is necessary to decide the case, but not to decide such issues.
U.S. v. Diebold, Inc.,
In
Fiduciary Trust Co. v. Fiduciary Trust Co.,
Del.Supr.,
From an appellate perspective, a decision granting summary judgment over the objection of the non-movant, does not, strictly speaking, present for review “factual findings” but rather presents the legal conclusion that there is no factual bar to the determination of the legal merit of the movant’s position. Since that determination is made on a paper record we аre free to draw our own inferences as to the legal significance of such evidence. Given the same record, the Court is as institutionally competent to discern the existence of factual disputes as is the trial court. 6 Moore’s Federal Practice H 56.27[1] (1992). The scope of our review is therefore unqualified.
IV
We now turn to Merrill’s specific arguments on appeal. 2 Merrill first contends that the Superior Court erred in granting summary judgment on his fraud claim because he had clearly alleged and supported his contention that Crothall had represented to him that his position would be “permanent” when it in fact was not. He complains that the Superior Court mistakenly extended the broad discretion accorded employers under at-will employment contracts as constituting a defense to a claim of fraud. He further argues that the practical effect of thе lower court’s ruling is to allow an employer to misrepresent any aspect of a particular job offer as long as the employee knows that the position is “at-will.”
A common law action for fraud is well recognized under Delaware law.
Stephenson v. Capano Development, Inc.,
Del.Supr.,
V
Merrill next argues the Superior Court erred in granting summary judgment on *101 his claim that Crothall breached an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In a separate count of the complaint, Merrill alleged that Crothall through Woomer, failed to act in good faith by inducing him to accept an offer of employment even though it was Woomer’s unspoken intention that Merrill remain in the position only temporarily. As a preliminary matter, we must determine whether Merrill could recover on such a claim, given any set of facts to support it. We must thus determine whether this claim constitutes a cognizable cause of action under Delaware law.
Merrill relies on an unreported decision of the Superior Court for the proposition thаt an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing exists in every employment contract in Delaware.
See Shockley v. General Foods Corp.,
Del.Super., C.A. 87C-DE-13, Chandler, J.,
The proposition that implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing underlie a contractual relationship, is not a сoncept strange to Delaware law. In
Blish v. Thompson Automatic Arms Corp.,
Del.Supr.,
We recognize that there is tension between the self-interest which an employer is legally entitled to pursue in all contractual undertakings and the requirement not to overreach in the hiring process. In the absence of statutory or collective bargaining restrictions, the parties to an employment agreement are free to pursue their separate economic goals. An employer may be motivated by its own legitimate business interests when making employment decisions and it may advance those interests, for the most part, however it chooses.
Fortune,
What is required for a showing that an implied covenant of fair dealing has been breached is another matter. It has been said that “to constitute a breach of the implied covenant of good faith, the conduct of the employer must constitute ‘an aspect of fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.’ ”
Magnan,
*102
In the present case, Merrill alleged that Crothall induced him to enter into the employment contract by concealing from him its intention to employ him only temporarily while allowing him to proceed under the belief that the duration of the employment was, at the least, indefinite. So stated, a valid claim for breach of an impliеd covenant of fair dealing is properly pleaded. An employer may not in good faith knowingly allow an employee to assume that the duration of an employment contract is indefinite, when it is, in secret contemplation of the employer, of limited duration. The duration of an employment contract is clearly material to one’s decision to accept a new position, especially where, as here, the assumption of the new position requires surrender of present employment, however minimal by comparison, and relocation to another state. Our law provides a heavy presumption that a contract for employment, unless otherwise expressly stated, is at-will in nature, with duration indefinite.
See Heideck v. Kent General Hospital, Inc.,
Del.Supr.,
To survive a motion for summary judgment, Merrill was required to support his claim with facts sufficient to show that a material issue existed as to one or more of the elements for recovery for breach of the implied covenant.
Moore v. Sizemore,
VI
Although our holding in this case permits Merrill’s claim for breach of contract to proceed, certain caveats are in order. Merrill’s claim for damages must be considered in light of the fact that the position he believed he was accepting, although described as permanent, was of indefinite duration to continue at the will of his employer. If it appears from the evidence that his employment would have been terminated for reasons arising after the inception of employment and unrelated to the alleged bad faith of Crothall, his recovery might well be limited to damages attributable to inducement, i.e., that previous employment surrendered and the expense of relocation.
Finally, we do not rest our holding on, nor did we consider, what constitutes justification for termination of an at-will employment contract. Although the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may be breached by termination in some circumstances,
see, e.g., Magnan,
The judgment of the Superior Court is Affirmed in part and Reversed in part and Remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision.