46 F.4th 811
9th Cir.2022Background
- Five Oakland police officers were involved in a fatal March 2018 shooting; internal Police Department and the CPRA (civilian review) concluded the use of force was reasonable.
- A Compliance Director appointed under the Allen consent decree (federal oversight of Oakland PD) disagreed and recommended termination.
- The Police Commission convened a Discipline Committee (triggered by the Compliance Director’s disagreement) which agreed with the Compliance Director and the City terminated the officers.
- Officers filed a state-court petition for writ of mandate and declaratory relief arguing the Commission violated the City Charter and municipal code in convening the Discipline Committee.
- City removed to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, arguing the federal Allen Consent Decree governed; district court entered judgment for the City.
- Ninth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded with instructions to remand to state court, holding federal courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under both federal-question branches.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether federal jurisdiction exists because federal law created the causes of action | Negrete: Claims are state-law writ/declaratory actions under the Charter and municipal code (no federal cause). | City: The Consent Decree and federal orders required the City to give effect to the Compliance Director’s findings, creating a federal question. | Held: No federal-cause jurisdiction; plaintiffs assert only state-law remedies and a federal defense does not create removal jurisdiction. |
| Whether the suit is equivalent to a Rule 60-type collateral attack on a federal consent decree (i.e., disguised federal action) | Negrete: Petition seeks state-law compliance/clarification, not to challenge or modify the Consent Decree. | City: The action undermines the federal decree’s operation and thus implicates federal jurisdiction. | Held: Not equivalent to a Rule 60 challenge — officers were not parties (or in privity) to Allen and do not seek relief affecting the federal decree. |
| Whether the case raises a substantial federal question (Grable/Gunn test) necessarily raised and substantial | Negrete: Any federal issue is only a potential defense (whether Consent Decree conflicts with Charter) and thus not an essential element of the claims. | City: Resolving the effect of the federal Consent Decree is necessary to resolve the dispute, so a federal issue is necessarily raised. | Held: No substantial federal question jurisdiction — the federal issue is not necessarily raised as an essential element of the state-law claims and arises, at most, as an anticipated defense. |
| Whether declaratory relief invoking federal issues supplies federal jurisdiction | Negrete: Declaratory relief in state court cannot be used to manufacture federal jurisdiction when the federal issue would otherwise be a defense. | City: Declaratory relief implicating the Consent Decree justifies federal jurisdiction. | Held: Skelly/Franchise Tax Board principles bar jurisdiction; declaratory requests that merely anticipate a federal defense do not confer federal-question jurisdiction. |
Key Cases Cited
- Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (jurisdictional limits and courts’ independent duty to ensure SMJ)
- Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251 (two-branch framework for "arising under" federal-question jurisdiction)
- Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (substantial federal question test explained)
- Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (federal defense does not authorize removal)
- Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 1 (limits on removal based on declaratory relief and federal defenses)
- Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (Declaratory Judgment Act did not extend federal jurisdiction)
- Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (well-pleaded complaint rule for federal-question jurisdiction)
- Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375 (federal courts’ limited jurisdiction and rule for enforcing federal judgments)
- Eyak Native Vill. v. Exxon Corp., 25 F.3d 773 (recharacterizing state actions as federal independent actions to attack federal judgments only in narrow circumstances)
- Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470 (preclusion/defensive federal claims do not permit removal)