Frances Spurlock v. David Fox
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 9475
6th Cir.2013Background
- This is a class-action alleging racial resegregation in Nashville public schools after the 2008 Rezoning Plan.
- The Plan replaced noncontiguous transfer zones with 'choice zones' allowing neighborhood or same-cluster transfers with district-provided transportation.
- The Plan also expanded resources for underutilized, predominantly Black, schools and reallocated high-income areas into the Pearl-Cohn Cluster.
- Task Force members developed the Plan; Board approved it in July 2008, with full implementation in 2009-10.
- Plaintiffs claim the Plan steered Black students to inferior, racially isolated schools, violating Equal Protection.
- District court found no facial race classification, no segregative intent, and rational-basis review supported the Plan.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the Rezoning Plan facially classify by race? | Spurlock argues Plan uses race indirectly via data-driven decisions. | Board asserts geography-based, facially neutral plan with no race-based classification. | No facial race classification; Plan is facially neutral. |
| Was there de jure segregation with segregative intent? | Intent to segregate inferred from plan’s impact and data use. | No discriminatory intent; parties point to neutral aims to fix utilization and gaps. | No proof of segregative intent; Arlington Heights factors support lack of intent. |
| Does disparate impact alone establish constitutional violation under rational-basis review? | Disparate impact signals unconstitutional purpose and segregation. | Disparate impact is not enough; plan is rationally related to legitimate interests. | Disparate impact alone insufficient; rational-basis review upholds Plan. |
| Does the Plan’s overall effect violate equal protection despite no race-based classification or intent? | Plan increases Black isolation and harms achievement; violates equal protection. | Plan modestly increases utilization and does not cause constitutional harm. | No constitutional violation; Plan passes rational-basis scrutiny. |
Key Cases Cited
- Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (U.S. Supreme Court (2007)) (strict scrutiny for explicit race classifications; data use permissible if policy facially neutral)
- Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (U.S. Supreme Court (1977)) (intent factors for discriminatory purpose; disparate impact not alone enough)
- Feeney, Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v., 442 U.S. 256 (U.S. Supreme Court (1979)) (disparate-impact evidence not conclusive of discriminatory intent; intent must be 'because of' race)
- Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (U.S. Supreme Court (1886)) (rare cases of pattern where impact reveals intentional discrimination)
- Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (U.S. Supreme Court (1960)) (extreme geometric manipulation to disenfranchise voters; not applicable here but relevance to intent)
- Lansing Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d 1042 (6th Cir. 1977) (neighborhood policy not per se unconstitutional; considers intent and impact)
- Doe ex rel. Doe v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 665 F.3d 524 (3d Cir. 2011) (demographic data used in policy-making not inherently discriminatory)
- Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (U.S. Supreme Court (1979)) (disparate impact not by itself a constitutional violation)