Frampton v. SCDNR, 5726

Background

On Sept 4, 2010 Frampton reported neck pain after riding in a bumpy pickup; he later underwent cervical discectomy and fusion performed by Dr. Byron Bailey in March 2011.
Dr. Bailey had treated Frampton for cervical radiculopathy before Sept 2010; medical records from March 2010 documented preexisting neck/arm symptoms.
Frampton filed a Form 50 in Nov 2014 seeking disability for the dove-field injury; DNR’s Form 51 admitted an injury to the cervical spine but denied extent, denied arm injury, and later contested causation and entitlement.
The single commissioner found Frampton had a 20% permanent partial disability to the spine, concluded Frampton had a preexisting condition and did not meet the statutory burden under §42-9-35, but nevertheless awarded benefits because DNR had admitted the claim and provided treatment.
The appellate panel reversed the award, holding the single commissioner’s finding that Frampton failed to prove aggravation under §42-9-35 was correct and, because unappealed, was the law of the case, so Frampton was not entitled to benefits.
The court affirmed the appellate panel, holding substantial evidence supported the conclusion that Frampton did not prove the dove-field incident aggravated his preexisting condition and that employer admission did not relieve his statutory burden.

Issues

Issue	Frampton	DNR	Held
Whether DNR’s admission of a cervical-spine injury relieved Frampton of proving aggravation of a preexisting condition under §42-9-35	Admission meant only extent was disputed; Frampton need not prove compensability	Admission did not absolve claimant’s statutory burden; §42-9-35 is a prerequisite when a preexisting condition exists	Court held claimant still bore the burden under §42-9-35; employer admission did not remove that burden and substantial evidence supported denial
Whether the dove-field incident proximately caused the disabling treatment/surgery	The dove-field event caused or materially contributed to the disability and surgery	Preexisting, progressive degenerative disease predating the incident; treatment/surgery were part of ongoing care, not caused by the incident	Court held substantial evidence supported that treatment/surgery were not causally related to the dove-field incident
Whether the June 2011 car accident was a superseding intervening cause	Single commissioner found it did not break causation	Argued the car accident intervened and severed liability from the Sept 2010 incident (Geathers)	Single commissioner found Geathers inapplicable; appellate panel’s decision turned on failure to prove aggravation under §42-9-35 rather than resolving a superseding-cause reversal
Whether the single commissioner erred by considering Frampton’s return to work and promotions in assessing impairment	Argued it was improper to factor return to work/promotions into impairment rating	Commissioner may consider return to work/earning capacity for credibility and entitlement findings	Issue was unpreserved on appeal; court rejected challenge and noted commissioner only relied on return-to-work for credibility and §42-9-10 issues not before the court

Key Cases Cited

Geathers v. 3V, Inc., 641 S.E.2d 29 (S.C. 2007) (when a subsequent disabling injury aggravates a preexisting but non‑disabling condition, compensability is limited to the second injury)
Burnette v. City of Greenville, 737 S.E.2d 200 (Ct. App. 2012) (claimant must prove by a preponderance that a subsequent work injury aggravated a preexisting condition under §42‑9‑35)
Crisp v. SouthCo. Inc., 738 S.E.2d 835 (S.C. 2013) (claimant has burden to prove facts bringing injury within workers’ compensation law; awards cannot be based on surmise)
Dozier v. Am. Red Cross, 768 S.E.2d 222 (Ct. App. 2014) (employer providing treatment does not necessarily waive right to contest compensability)
Murphy v. Owens Corning, 710 S.E.2d 454 (Ct. App. 2011) (aggravation of a dormant condition becomes compensable when the aggravating injury renders it disabling)
Turner v. SAIIA Constr., 796 S.E.2d 150 (Ct. App. 2016) (an accidental injury is compensable only if it arises out of and in the course of employment; requires proximate causation)