Frakes v. Nay
254 Or. App. 236
Or. Ct. App.2012Background
- Nay, an attorney, prepared the Salings' revocable trust and later served as successor trustee of the 1996 Saling Family Trust; Raymond Frakes, a trust beneficiary, sued Nay for inspection of Nay's estate-planning files, accounting, and reimbursement of expenses Frankes incurred as Velma Saling's health care agent.
- Frakes asserted claims against Nay individually (breach of contract, professional malpractice, and intentional interference with Frakes’s expectancy) and Nay, as trustee, counterclaimed that Frakes violated a no-contest clause, seeking disgorgement of distributions and forfeiture of remaining amounts.
- Jury found Nay as attorney liable on individual claims while Frakes prevailed on some trustee-claims; the court entered judgment denying Frakes on the attorney-claims and ruling in Nay’s favor as to the no-contest counterclaim.
- Discovery disputes centered on Nay’s estate-planning file; the trial court ordered production, rejecting attorney-client privilege objections for at least part of the file due to an attested-document exception.
- The trial court permitted Frakes to obtain an accounting and inspect the estate-planning file; it later awarded Frakes $50,000 in attorney fees under former ORS 128.155 for the third claim, and left other fee issues for later resolution.
- Frakes and Nay both appealed/cross-appealed; the appellate court affirmed the trustee-claims, reversed and remanded the attorney-tort claims due to an erroneous verdict form, and remanded for greater explanation of the fee award basis.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the no-contest clause apply to Frakes’s claims against Nay-as-attorney? | Frakes: clause does not bar claims against Nay-as-attorney. | Nay-as-trustee: clause bars any contest implicating the trust. | No-contest clause does not apply to Nay-as-attorney. |
| Was Nay required to disclose the estate-planning file notwithstanding privilege? | Frakes: file contains non-privileged materials; disclosure required. | Nay: file is privileged as attorney-client; exceptions do not apply. | Discovery ruling upheld; privilege issue resolved based on document-specific exceptions. |
| Did the timing bar Frakes’s breach-of-contract claim and dismiss it as time-barred? | Frakes: contract claim arose from Nay’s duties in 1990/1996 and survived to 2005. | Nay: accrual occurred at breach long before 2005; statute barred. | Breach-of-contract claim barred; affirmed dismissal on statute of limitations grounds. |
| Is Frakes’s negligence claim viable against Nay-as-attorney, and was the verdict form proper? | Frakes: Hale/Caba third-party beneficiary theory supports negligence; form should not foreclose. | Nay: no duty to a non-client; statute of limitations and mootness concerns apply. | Negligence claim viable under third-party beneficiary theory; but verdict form error requires reversal and remand. |
| Did the trial court err in the special verdict form by conditioning consideration of breaches on testamentary capacity/undue influence findings? | Frakes: form improperly tied contract/tort issues to capacity/undue influence findings. | Nay: pleaded allegations tied to capacity/undue influence; form appropriate. | Special verdict form erroneous and prejudicial; remand for proper adjudication. |
Key Cases Cited
- Hale v. Groce, 304 Or. 281 (Or. 1987) (third-party beneficiary theory supporting negligent liability to intended beneficiaries)
- Caba v. Barker, 341 Or. 534 (Or. 2006) (third-party beneficiary doctrine limits negligence claims to intended beneficiaries with promise to testator)
- Butcher v. McClain, 244 Or. App. 316 (Or. App. 2011) (probat(e) remedies do not preclude related tort claims)
- Allen v. Hall, 328 Or. 276 (Or. 1999) (extension of intentional interference to prospective inheritance claims)
- Yancy v. Shatzer, 337 Or. 345 (Or. 2004) (mootness/justiciability governs whether relief remains possible)
- McCarthy v. Oregon Freeze Dry, Inc., 327 Or. 185 (Or. 1998) (attorney-fee award findings must be adequate for meaningful appellate review)
