Fourstar v. Garden City Group, Inc.
875 F.3d 1147
D.D.C.2017Background
- In 2014 Fourstar, a federal prisoner, filed a civil rights suit and an in forma pauperis (IFP) application; the district court denied IFP status and dismissed the suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) because Fourstar allegedly had three PLRA "strikes."
- The district court counted three prior dismissals as strikes: Murlak (dismissed as frivolous/failure to state a claim), Ness (federal claims dismissed for failure to state a claim; court declined supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims), and Zemyan (dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; state-law claims dismissed without prejudice).
- Fourstar conceded Murlak was a valid strike but argued Ness and Zemyan should not count because not all claims in those cases were dismissed on PLRA-enumerated grounds.
- The primary legal questions: (1) whether a mixed federal/state case counts as a strike when only the federal claims are dismissed on PLRA grounds and the court declines supplemental jurisdiction over state claims; and (2) whether a later district court may rely on an earlier court’s contemporaneous label that a dismissal is a "strike."
- The D.C. Circuit reviewed the issues de novo and applied the PLRA text and its prior decision in Thompson v. DEA.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a case counts as a PLRA "strike" when federal claims are dismissed on PLRA grounds but the court declines supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims | Ness and Zemyan should not count because not all claims in the action were dismissed for frivolousness, malice, or failure to state a claim | Allowing such additions of state claims would let prisoners evade strikes and undermine PLRA purposes | Held: No. A case counts as a strike only if the entire action was dismissed on enumerated PLRA grounds; declining supplemental jurisdiction over state claims does not convert the case into a strike |
| Whether a later district court may defer to an earlier district court’s contemporaneous labeling of a prior dismissal as a "strike" | Earlier courts’ explicit labels should be dispositive or at least entitled to deference | Later courts must independently determine whether prior dismissals meet § 1915(g)’s enumerated grounds; labels alone cannot bind later courts | Held: No. Later courts must independently evaluate whether prior dismissals were on PLRA-enumerated grounds; they may not simply accept prior "strike" labels |
Key Cases Cited
- Thompson v. DEA, 492 F.3d 428 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that a prior dismissal counts as a strike only if the entire action was dismissed on PLRA-enumerated grounds)
- Mitchell v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 587 F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (reinforcing that partial dismissals on non-enumerated grounds negate strike status)
- Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2005) (case counts as a strike only if dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim)
- Tolbert v. Stevenson, 635 F.3d 646 (4th Cir. 2011) ("action" in § 1915(g) means entire case; entire action must be dismissed on enumerated grounds)
- Turley v. Gaetz, 625 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir. 2010) (a strike attaches only when the entire action is dismissed on one of the three enumerated grounds)
- Byrd v. Shannon, 715 F.3d 117 (3d Cir. 2013) (agreeing that the entire action must be dismissed on enumerated grounds for a strike)
- Daker v. Commissioner, Georgia Dep’t of Corrections, 820 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2016) (same interpretation: only enumerated grounds produce strikes)
- Broum v. Megg, 857 F.3d 287 (5th Cir. 2017) (a strike does not issue when only some claims are dismissed on § 1915(g) grounds)
The D.C. Circuit reversed the district court: Ness and Zemyan do not qualify as strikes, Fourstar has only one strike (Murlak), and thus he may proceed IFP absent other disqualifying strikes.