181 A.3d 992
N.J.2018Background
- Morris County administered an Open Space/Farmland/Historic Preservation Trust; from 2012–2015 it awarded $11.1M in grants, $4.63M (41.7%) to twelve Christian churches for repair/restoration of active houses of worship.
- Eligible projects included stabilization, repair, restoration, and related work; successful applicants with >$50,000 construction grants had to execute 30‑year preservation easements and provide negotiated public access.
- Plaintiffs (Freedom from Religion Foundation and a county taxpayer) sued in state court, arguing the grants violate New Jersey Constitution art. I, ¶ 3 (Religious Aid Clause).
- The trial court upheld the grants, construing the clause not to be read literally and invoking neutrality; the Supreme Court granted direct certification.
- The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, holding the plain text of the Religious Aid Clause bars taxpayer funds to build or repair churches and that the County’s awards fell within that prohibition.
- The Court considered whether the State clause is preempted by the U.S. Free Exercise Clause (Trinity Lutheran and Locke considered) and concluded the State provision does not conflict with federal law in this context.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Morris County grants to repair active churches violate N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 3 (Religious Aid Clause) | The clause plainly forbids using tax funds to build or repair any place of worship; no historic‑preservation exception | The clause must be read with other constitutional provisions and neutrality principles; neutral, secular historic‑preservation programs may include churches | Held for plaintiffs: plain meaning bars taxpayer funds to repair active houses of worship; grants violated the Religious Aid Clause |
| Whether the State Religious Aid Clause is preempted by the Free Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution | Free Exercise does not require funding when the aid would directly advance religious worship; Trinity Lutheran is distinguishable | Trinity Lutheran requires exclusion of churches from generally available benefits would be invalid; denying funds violates Free Exercise | Held for State: applying the Religious Aid Clause here does not conflict with Free Exercise because the grants funded religious uses (repair to sustain worship) and Trinity Lutheran’s protection did not extend to religious uses of funding |
| Whether Trinity Lutheran compels allowing religious applicants to compete for these grants | Plaintiffs: Trinity Lutheran limited to nonreligious uses (playgrounds); direct repair of churches advances religion and is distinguishable | Defendants: Trinity Lutheran controls; program is neutral, competitive, secular purpose so excluding churches would be forbidden | Held: Trinity Lutheran does not require funding where the award would be used for religious worship or imagery (religious use); case is distinguishable |
| Whether federal Establishment or Equal Protection concerns would alter result | Plaintiffs: Establishment Clause likely bars grants that advance religion; Equal Protection not implicated | Defendants: funding is secular historic preservation, no Establishment problem; excluding churches raises equal‑protection concerns | Held: Court did not fully resolve Establishment Clause or Equal Protection questions because it held grants unconstitutional under state Religious Aid Clause and found no Free Exercise conflict; noted potential Establishment problems if Free Exercise permitted awards |
Key Cases Cited
- Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (U.S. 2017) (Free Exercise forbids categorical exclusion of religious organizations from a generally available public benefit; did not decide religious uses of funds)
- Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (U.S. 2004) (state anti‑establishment interest permitted denial of scholarship funds for devotional theology)
- Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1947) (incorporation of Establishment Clause and discussion of historic anti‑aid principles)
- Nyquist v. Mauclet, 413 U.S. 756 (U.S. 1973) (Establishment Clause invalidated state aid program where funds could directly subsidize religious activities)
- Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (U.S. 1971) (funding chapels or buildings used to promote religion has the primary effect of advancing religion)
- Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (U.S. 1993) (laws that target religious practice are not neutral and require strict scrutiny)
- McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (U.S. 1978) (laws imposing special disabilities on ministers subjected to strict scrutiny)
- Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (U.S. 1981) (Free Exercise limits on excluding religious groups from generally available benefits)
- American Atheists, Inc. v. City of Detroit Downtown Dev. Auth., 567 F.3d 278 (6th Cir. 2009) (upheld secular revitalization grants including exterior work on churches; distinguished here because repairs did not support worship)
- Resnick v. East Brunswick Bd. of Educ., 77 N.J. 88 (N.J. 1978) (permitted provision of general services like safety to religious institutions; limited precedent under N.J. Religious Aid Clause)