Foster v. University of Maryland-Eastern Shore
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 8384
| 4th Cir. | 2015Background
- Iris Foster, hired as a probationary campus police officer at University of Maryland–Eastern Shore, complained of repeated sexual harassment by coworker Rudolph Jones and submitted a written complaint to HR (Marie Billie).
- The University investigated, disciplined Jones (transfer, counseling, Last Chance Agreement), and thereafter Foster alleged she experienced retaliatory acts (probation extension, schedule changes, denial of benefits/training, denial of light duty).
- Foster repeatedly complained about perceived retaliation; shortly after her last complaints, her supervisor recommended termination and University officials (Billie, Holden) terminated Foster while on probation.
- Foster sued under Title VII for sex discrimination (disparate discharge), retaliation, and hostile work environment; the district court granted summary judgment for the University on discrimination and hostile-work-environment claims but initially denied summary judgment on retaliation.
- After the Supreme Court decided Nassar (holding retaliation claims require but-for causation), the district court granted reconsideration and then summary judgment for the University on the retaliation claim; Foster appealed.
- The Fourth Circuit held that Nassar did not change the McDonnell Douglas pretext framework: (1) Nassar does not alter the causation element of the prima facie case, and (2) McDonnell Douglas’s pretext stage already requires proof that retaliation was the actual (but-for) cause; the court reversed summary judgment on the retaliation claim and affirmed on discrimination and hostile-environment claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does Nassar impose a but‑for causation requirement at the prima facie stage of a McDonnell Douglas retaliation claim? | Nassar should not change the lighter causation needed for prima facie showing; plaintiff may use temporal proximity and other circumstantial evidence. | Nassar requires but‑for causation throughout retaliation law, including prima facie stage. | Nassar does not alter the prima facie causation standard; the prima facie causation element remains a lower burden. |
| Does Nassar change causation required at the pretext (ultimate burden) stage under McDonnell Douglas? | McDonnell Douglas already requires proof that retaliation was the real reason; plaintiff meets but‑for requirement at pretext stage. | Nassar requires a stricter but‑for showing beyond traditional pretext analysis. | Nassar does not change the pretext-stage requirement; plaintiff must show retaliation was the actual (but‑for) cause. |
| Was Foster’s evidence sufficient to create a genuine dispute on retaliation? | Billie’s admitted comment about Foster’s complaints, temporal proximity, and other adverse acts create triable issues about causation and pretext. | The University offered legitimate nonretaliatory reasons (leave use, inflexibility, safety concerns). | The Fourth Circuit held Foster produced enough evidence of pretext and causation to survive summary judgment on retaliation. |
| Were summary judgments for the University on discrimination and hostile-work-environment proper? | For discrimination, Foster argued replacement by a male sufficed; for hostile environment, prior complaints about Jones put University on notice. | University showed replacement was better qualified and that it promptly investigated and effectively remedied harassment; prior complaint was investigated and found without probable cause. | Court affirmed: discrimination claim fails for lack of similarly qualified replacement; hostile-environment claim fails because employer took effective remedial action and reasonably relied on prior investigation findings. |
Key Cases Cited
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (established the burden‑shifting framework for discrimination/retaliation cases)
- University of Texas Southwestern Medical Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013) (retaliation claims require traditional but‑for causation)
- Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000) (prima facie case plus evidence of falsity of employer's reasons may permit an inference of discrimination)
- Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277 (4th Cir. 2004) (discussing mixed‑motive and pretext frameworks in retaliation context)
- Price v. Thompson, 380 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 2004) (applying McDonnell Douglas to retaliation claims)
- Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1989) (employer liability where employer reasonably should have anticipated harassment and failed to prevent it)
- Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355 (4th Cir. 1985) (pre‑Gross era articulation that pretext stage requires but‑for causation)