Foster v. Mountain Coal Company
830 F.3d 1178
| 10th Cir. | 2016Background
- Foster worked as a maintenance supervisor at Mountain Coal’s West Elk Mine and injured his neck on February 5, 2008; he was out of work through March 28 for the neck issue and a scheduled hernia operation.
- Mountain Coal required a company return-to-work form; after initial ER paperwork was rejected, Foster eventually obtained a March 18 form from his primary-care physician (Dr. Funk) and Mountain Coal acknowledges receipt of that form.
- On April 3 Foster was suspended following a meeting where managers questioned whether he had previously delivered an earlier completed return-to-work form; Foster testified he asked the company to cooperate with upcoming surgery scheduling and recovery (an accommodation request).
- Foster saw Dr. Dwyer (orthopedist) and on April 4 Dwyer expressed doubt surgery was warranted and suggested different work activities; on April 11 Dr. Funk wrote a letter stating Foster was disabled from his usual occupation and would likely need surgery, which Foster read to his supervisor (another accommodation request).
- Mountain Coal terminated Foster by letter dated April 11 (effective April 9), citing that Foster gave false information about a credible return-to-work slip; Foster filed EEOC charges and sued under the ADA, alleging retaliation for requesting accommodations.
- The district court granted summary judgment for Mountain Coal on Foster’s ADA retaliation claims; the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding genuine disputes of material fact exist on protected activity, causation, and pretext.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Foster engaged in protected activity by requesting accommodations on April 3 and April 11 | Foster: April 3 comments asking for cooperation to schedule surgery/recovery and April 11 reading Dr. Funk’s letter constituted adequate requests for accommodation | Mountain Coal: April 3 comments were not sufficiently direct or specific to notify the employer; April 11 argument challenged on timing (termination already effective April 9) | Court: A reasonable jury could find April 3 comments adequate; April 11 request is undisputedly adequate when/if it preceded termination |
| Causation (link between protected activity and termination) | Foster: Temporal proximity (days/hours) suffices to show causal connection | Mountain Coal: Temporal proximity alone insufficient (citing Nassar); also contends it had preexisting discipline plans | Court: Temporal proximity here (very short) can establish causation at prima facie stage; disputed facts about suspension/termination timing defeat summary judgment |
| Employer’s proffered legitimate reason for termination (lying about return-to-work form) | Foster: Employer’s stated reasons are inconsistent and thus pretextual | Mountain Coal: Termination based on belief Foster lied or provided incorrect form/date — a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason | Court: Inconsistencies among managers’ explanations, timing of termination letter, and other facts create triable issues of pretext |
| Whether summary judgment was appropriate | Foster: No — genuine issues of material fact on protected activity, causation, pretext | Mountain Coal: Yes — inadequate notice, termination preceded later request, and legitimate reason shown | Held: Reversed district court; summary judgment improper and case remanded for further proceedings |
Key Cases Cited
- Proctor v. United Parcel Serv., 502 F.3d 1200 (10th Cir.) (summary-judgment review and ADA retaliation context)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (burden-shifting framework for circumstantial discrimination/retaliation claims)
- Selenke v. Medical Imaging of Colorado, 248 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir.) (retaliation protection for employees with a good-faith belief they are disabled)
- Jones v. U.P.S., Inc., 502 F.3d 1176 (10th Cir.) (requests for reasonable accommodation treated as protected activity)
- Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 355 F.3d 6 (1st Cir.) (adequacy standard: request must be sufficiently direct and specific)
- EEOC v. C.R. Eng., Inc., 644 F.3d 1028 (10th Cir.) (notice/adequacy of accommodation request need not use magic words but must inform employer of need)
- Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (Sup. Ct.) (but-for causation discussion in retaliation claims)
- Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (Sup. Ct.) (employers may proceed with previously planned actions despite protected activity)
- Anderson v. Coors Brewing Co., 181 F.3d 1171 (10th Cir.) (temporal proximity and causation in retaliation claims)