Foster v. Foster
2016 Ark. 456
| Ark. | 2016Background
- Christopher and Leah Foster divorced after a 12‑year marriage with three minor children; Christopher was primary earner and Leah was a long‑time stay‑at‑home parent with an inactive/limited real‑estate practice.
- Trial court awarded Leah rehabilitative alimony for ten years: $4,500/month (years 1–3), $3,500/month (years 4–6), $2,500/month (years 7–10), plus child support; it also awarded Leah $14,190 in attorney’s fees and $647.18 in costs.
- Leah proffered (but the court did not admit) a written rehabilitative plan and testified about her intent to reenter the workforce; Christopher objected to the plan’s admission and argued no rehabilitative‑plan requirement had been met.
- Christopher appealed, arguing (1) the court improperly applied permanent‑alimony factors to rehabilitative alimony, (2) the award’s amount/duration abused discretion, and (3) attorney’s fees should not have been awarded in addition to alimony.
- The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed; the Arkansas Supreme Court granted review and affirmed the circuit court as to both alimony and fees (vacating the court of appeals opinion).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Christopher) | Defendant's Argument (Leah) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Proper statutory standard for rehabilitative alimony | 2013 amendment requires different factors; rehabilitative awards must focus on a concrete rehabilitation plan and not use permanent‑alimony factors | Traditional alimony factors remain relevant; statute permits but does not require a plan and courts may consider usual factors when appropriate | Majority: Traditional factors are relevant; §9‑12‑312(b) is permissive about plans and trial court did not err in applying those factors to award rehabilitative alimony |
| 2) Requirement/feasibility of a rehabilitative plan | Leah failed to submit/obtain an approved plan with concrete, enforceable goals; court erred by awarding rehabilitative alimony without such plan | Statute uses "may" — plan is permissive; Leah proffered testimony about a plan and court found modified plan reasonable | Majority: statute does not mandate a plan; trial court’s findings that the proposed plan was reasonable were sufficient |
| 3) Amount and duration (abuse of discretion) | Award ($4,500→$3,500→$2,500 over 10 years plus fees) excessive and not tied properly to rehabilitation; ignored Christopher’s expenses | Amount/duration were reasonable given parties’ income, expenses, custodial needs, and time needed to transition to self‑support | Majority: no abuse of discretion — trial court reasonably tailored amounts/duration to needs and payor’s ability |
| 4) Award of attorney’s fees and costs | Billing statement allegedly unreliable; some expenses not recoverable under Rule 54 | Leah lacked ability to pay and Christopher had liquid funds; costs authorized by statute | Majority: fee award within trial court’s discretion and costs recoverable under §9‑12‑309; affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Moore v. Moore, 486 S.W.3d 766 (Ark. 2016) (statutory‑interpretation principles; review treated as original to Supreme Court)
- Taylor v. Taylor, 250 S.W.3d 232 (Ark. 2007) (purpose of alimony: rectify economic imbalances; trial court discretion)
- Kuchmas v. Kuchmas, 243 S.W.3d 270 (Ark. 2006) (primary factors: need and ability to pay; secondary factors list)
- Bolan v. Bolan, 796 S.W.2d 358 (Ark. Ct. App. 1990) (definition of rehabilitative alimony as time‑limited aid to self‑support)
- Dew v. Dew, 390 S.W.3d 764 (Ark. Ct. App. 2012) (upholding rehabilitative alimony under similar homemaker facts)