| iThis is a divorce case. Appellant Suzanne Dew asserts error in the circuit court’s distribution of the parties’ property. Appellee Terry Dew brings a cross-appeal challenging the award of alimony to Suzanne. We affirm on direct and cross-appeal.
The parties, who were married in May 1995 and separated in June 2008, are the parents of two children, born in 1992 and 1998. They own a large tract of land in Knoxville, Arkansas, on which are located two houses, the “Dew Residence” and the “Doxa Retreat,” and a farm, 130 acres known as the “Dew Farm.” They own other real property in Pope and Johnson Counties.
Trial was held on January 21-23, 2009, аnd September 23-24, 2009. In March 2010, Terry filed a motion for the court to enter a decree. The court held a hearing on April 16, 2010. The circuit court entered the divorce decree on May 14, 2010, awarding the divorce to Terry on the grounds of general indignities. The court ordered him to pay $8000 per month for forty-eight months to Suzanne for rehabilitative
The circuit court awarded the Doxa Retreat and four contiguous acres to Suzanne. It awarded Terry the marital home, the Dew Residence, and five contiguous acres. The court directed each party to be responsible for the indebtedness on the property awarded to him or her. It ruled that the parties would hold the Dew Farm as tenants in common. It also awarded the real property and improvements located on Aspen Lane in Russell-ville to the parties as ^tenants in common. The court made the same distribution of approximately fifty acres in Johnson County (the Perry Bluff property).
The court awarded Terry the miscellaneous assets, including ownership of the assets of OncoPet, his interеst in the Pulaski County Animal Emergency Clinic, and the tax credit from the parties’ 2008 individual income tax returns; Terry would be solely responsible for any additional taxes for 2008.
Taking into consideration the agreed upon adjustment to the tax liabilities for 2008, the equalization of the parties’ total assets and liabilities shall be implemented by the plaintiff | ¿paying to the defendant the sum of $51,631 in cash within 30 days of the division of the assets in their Morgan Keegan joint investment account.
It directed the parties to agree on the division of the rest of their personal property within thirty days.
Suzanne moved for new trial on May 20, 2010, arguing that the trial court did not equally divide the parties’ marital property or justify its failure to do so in compliance with Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-12-315. She also asserted that the award of the Dew Residence, which the parties had purchased in 1995, to Terry contravened the pre-1997 version of Arkansas
I. Direct appeal
A. Distribution of the Marital Property
Suzanne begins her appeal by asserting thаt, in spite of the circuit court’s stated intention to equally divide the parties’ assets, it failed to do so. She acknowledges the court’s ruling that the Dew Farm, Aspen Lane, and Perry Bluff real property would be held as tenants in common, and that the household goods, nonbusiness personal property, escrow deposit, Morgan Keegan investment account, and the retirement accounts were equally distributed, but asserts thаt the remaining assets were not divided equally. Suzanne argues that, if this court affirms the trial court’s decree, she would receive a total of $225,275 worth of assets (the Doxa Retreat, the health savings account, the Regions and Caneystone checking accounts, and the Morgan Keegan savings account). She also asserts that the value of the Dew Residence, Parsel Properties’ operating account, thе 2008 tax overpayment, custodial accounts for the parties’ children, and the Regions/First State checking account amounted to $333,173. |fiTo this subtotal, she adds the award to Terry of 100 percent of Azzore, the option to purchase Azzore’s office building, the Pulaski County Animal Emergency Clinic, and OncoPet. She states:
In exchange for all of these business interests, the circuit court awarded Suzanne a cash sum of $51,631 plus an extra $2,500.00 for her marital interest in the $5,000 escrow deposit returned to Terry in connection with the Parkway Clinic. Suzanne contends that this distribution of assets is grossly inequitable.
To the $333,173 figure, Suzanne adds $126,287 for the September 24, 2009 amounts in AVX’s First State Operations, merchant and setback accounts, along with the First State checking and Azzore Regions Operating accounts; at this point, her subtotal equals $459,460. To this amount, she adds an additional $41,153 for
Suzanne primarily disputes the trial court’s findings of fact about the value of Terry’s businesses. She acknowledges that the parties introduced “widely conflicting” evidence about the value of the business assets. She asserts that the circuit court did not assign a value to any of thе parties’ assets and that it is impossible for this court to determine whether she received an equal share of the marital assets. She argues that, because the record is not fully developed, we should remand to the trial court to receive additional evidence and make findings regarding the valuation of all of the parties’ assets. She states: “In the final analysis, it is the practice’s fair market value which must be dеtermined if the parties’ assets are to be divided equally.” She states that Terry’s expert, Dr. Elry Phillips, addressed the practice’s “fair value,” [ 7not its fair market value, and that the circuit court approved that method of valuation; thus, the court focused on the orderly-disposition value of his practice’s component assets, as if Terry were to liquidate those assets piecemeal on the date the divorсe was granted. She contends that Terry’s practice should be valued as a going concern, which she distinguishes from personal goodwill (which is not transferable or divisible in a divorce proceeding). She states: “The value of Terry’s veterinary practice is more than the mere sum total of its tangible assets that can be seen, touched, or counted. Consideration of the practice as a whole entity is requirеd.” Suzanne also argues that the trial court erred in not taking into account the amount spent on leasehold improvements ($103,000, according to Suzanne) in valuing Terry’s practice.
On appeal, divorce cases are reviewed de novo. Friend v. Friend,
The supreme court has explicitly approved the use of the “fair market value” standard for valuing businesses in the context of a marital property division, Skocos v. Skokos,
Because Suzanne has raised the “ongoing enterprise” argument for the first time on appeal, we do not address it. An issue must be presented to the circuit court at the.earliest opportunity in order to preserve it for appeal. Horton v. Horton,
Therе are other flaws in Suzanne’s argument. She erroneously included the children’s money and the 2008 tax overpayment, which was applied to the parties’ tax obligation for 2009, in her list of assets purportedly awarded to Terry. She did not account for the businesses’ liabilities. The testimony, obviously credited by the trial court, and the exhibits introduced by Terry more than adequately demonstrated that the trial court equally distributed the marital estate. Giving due deference to the trial court’s superior ability to | mobserve the witnesses and assign credibility, its overall distribution of the parties’ property was not clearly erroneous.
B. The Option to Purchase the Leased Real Estate
Suzanne next argues that the circuit court committed an error of law in ruling that the right to purchase the clinic building, which Azzore leased, was not a marital asset subject to division. The court concluded that, although the option was a legаl right acquired during the parties’ marriage, which Terry could choose to exercise, it was “simply contingent on a future event that may never happen” and was not marital property. Citing Richardson v. Richardson,
C. The Dew Residence
Suzanne further argues that the trial court erred in awarding Terry the Dew Residence in its entirety because it was acquired by the parties before 1997, when Arkansas Code |T1Annotated section 9-12-317 was amended. The predecessor to that statute was addressed in Cole, supra, when we reversed the trial court’s award of the parties’ marital residence to the wife. We held that, under the pre-1997 version of the statute, the trial court was authorized only to order the property sold, give a party possession of the property until it would be sold at some future time, or leave the parties as tenants in common. See also Brown v. Brown,
Suzanne concludes her brief by arguing that the trial court did not follow § 9-12-315(a)(l)(A)’s requirеment that marital property be distributed at the time the divorce was entered because it rejected her proffer of updated evidence of the September 24, 2009 value of certain assets and denied her motion for a new trial. We disagree. The circuit court’s power to grant a new trial under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 59 (2011) is necessarily broad and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence оf an abuse of discretion. Payne v. Donaldson,
On cross-appeal; Terry argues that the trial court’s award of alimony is not reasonable, pointing out Suzanne’s ability to earn a living with her valid veterinary license. He also states that she overstated her monthly expenses and that the trial court did not take into account the other expenses that he is paying on behalf of Suzanne or his reduced income after he adjusted his schedule and the nature of his practice, with much less travel, to accommodate the | ^demands of being the custodial parent. The purpose of alimony is to rectify the economic imbalance in earning power and standard of living of the parties to a divorce in light of the particular facts of each case. Burns v. Burns,
At the time of the trial, Suzannе was forty-eight years old and receiving counseling for depression. Although she received substantial property, including a home, in the distribution of assets, she had not worked for years; had no job or offers of employment; and would require some retraining to secure a well-paying position. In closing arguments to the trial court, Terry’s attorneys agreed that Suzanne would be entitled to some alimony, suggesting two years in the apрroximate amount of $4400 per month without a reduction for child 114support. In light of the broad discretion vested in the trial court, we hold that the trial court did not clearly err in setting Suzanne’s alimony award.
Affirmed.
Notes
. Title to some of their real property was held by Parsel Properties, LLC.
. The court directed that Parsel Properties be dissolved after transfer of the property.
. The parties agreed to file joint income tax returns for 2008.