Forras v. Rauf, 39 F. Supp. 3d 45

Background

Plaintiffs Larry Klayman and Vincent Forras sued Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf and attorney Adam Leitman Bailey for defamation, false light, assault, and intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from statements in Bailey’s motion to dismiss a New York case about an Islamic community center near Ground Zero and a subsequent New York Post article.
The statements at issue appeared in defendants’ motion to dismiss in the New York Supreme Court and were later partially published in the New York Post.
Plaintiffs initially sued in New York (motion to dismiss granted later), then filed in D.C. Superior Court; they dismissed that action and commenced this diversity action in federal court.
Defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rules 12(b) and, centrally, under the D.C. Anti‑SLAPP Act (special motion to dismiss). Defendants also sought attorney’s fees under the Anti‑SLAPP Act.
The district court held that the Anti‑SLAPP Act applies in federal diversity cases, found defendants made the requisite prima facie showing that the statements were protected (made in a judicial proceeding), and concluded plaintiffs failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits for all claims.
The court dismissed the complaint under the Anti‑SLAPP Act, ruled many claims time‑barred by D.C.’s one‑year statute of limitations, and retained jurisdiction to adjudicate attorney’s fees motions.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Applicability of D.C. Anti‑SLAPP Act in a federal diversity case	Anti‑SLAPP procedure is procedural and conflicts with FRCP 12/56, so it cannot apply in federal diversity (relying on 3M v. Boulter)	Anti‑SLAPP creates substantive rights to fend off SLAPPs and is therefore applicable in federal diversity actions	Anti‑SLAPP applies in federal diversity cases (court follows appellate and D.D.C. precedent finding substantive effect)
Whether statements are an act in furtherance of advocacy on a public‑interest issue (prima facie showing)	Plaintiffs contend statements were defamatory and not protected	Statements were made in a motion to dismiss in an ongoing judicial proceeding, so they are protected advocacy under Anti‑SLAPP	Defendants made a prima facie showing: statements occurred in connection with a judicial proceeding and are protected activity
Likelihood of success on merits (defamation / false light)	Plaintiffs claim statements were false, published, and caused harm	Statements are absolutely privileged under the judicial‑proceedings privilege for communications related to litigation	Plaintiffs failed to show likelihood of success; judicial‑proceedings privilege bars defamation and false light claims
Statute of limitations	Plaintiffs assert relation‑back/that their D.C. Superior Court filing saved the claims	Defendants argue claims accrued at original publication (Oct. 12, 2010) and are subject to D.C.’s one‑year limitation	Claims accrued on first publication and are time‑barred; relation‑back inapplicable because the Superior Court action was a separate prior proceeding

Key Cases Cited

Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (establishes Erie doctrine on application of state substantive law in diversity)
Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2010) (permits application of state anti‑SLAPP statute in federal diversity cases)
U.S. ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 1999) (same)
Henry v. Lake Charles Am. Press, LLC, 566 F.3d 164 (5th Cir. 2009) (adopts Newsham reasoning)
Blodgett v. Univ. Club, 930 A.2d 210 (D.C. 2007) (elements of defamation under D.C. law)
Mohler v. Houston, 356 A.2d 646 (D.C. 1976) (judicial‑proceedings privilege for attorneys)
Arneja v. Gildar, 541 A.2d 621 (D.C. 1988) (application of judicial‑proceedings privilege to pre‑hearing statements)
Jung v. Jung, 791 A.2d 46 (D.C. 2002) (standard for intentional infliction of emotional distress in D.C.)
Mullin v. Washington Free Weekly, Inc., 785 A.2d 296 (D.C. 2001) (single‑publication rule and accrual for defamation claims)