43 F. Supp. 3d 537
D. Md.2014Background
- Fordyce, an African-American Administrative Assistant employed since 2005 by Prince George’s County Police Department, sues for retaliation and hostile work environment under multiple statutes.
- 2007: Fordyce is denied a promotion and files EEOC complaints alleging race, sex, and national origin discrimination; 2007–2009: settlement leads to promotion, title change, and pay raise.
- 2010: Fordyce is transferred to the Fusion Center; alleged staff hostility, lack of job title/description, and misalignment of supervision; TRU becomes operational again only in Feb 2011.
- 2010–2011: incidents include a June 30, 2010 confrontation with Corporal Brooks, internal investigation, mediation, and a July 15 disciplinary action barring Fusion Center access; Aug 2010 transfer to TRU; Oct 2010 EEO complaints; 2011 final disciplinary action with fines.
- 2011: Fordyce files EEOC charge; 2013: defendant moves for summary judgment; court denies in part and grants in part, dismissing some claims and allowing others to proceed.
- Decision: summary judgment granted in part and denied in part; Title VI and Title VII retaliation claims survive, others dismissed/treated as outlined in the memorandum.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Title VI claim survives (ARRA funds as primary employment objective). | Fordyce argues defendant received ARRA funds primarily to provide employment. | County argues plaintiff not an intended beneficiary and funds not for primary employment objective. | Summary judgment denied on Title VI; genuine dispute as to primary objective of federal funds. |
| Whether Title IX applies and can be asserted against a police department. | Title IX employment discrimination applies to federally funded educational institutions. | Defendant is not an educational institution receiving education funds; Title IX not applicable. | Summary judgment granted for defendant; Title IX claim dismissed. |
| Whether Title VII retaliation claims survive (adverse actions and pretext). | Transfers to TRU and disciplinary action were materially adverse; pretext shown by sequence and investigation findings. | Actions taken for legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons under policy; no adverse action or pretext. | Partial denial of summary judgment: retaliation claims survive; factual dispute as to adverse actions and pretext. |
| Whether retaliatory hostile work environment claim survives. | Retaliatory actions created hostile environment. | Actions were managerial, not severe or pervasive. | Summary judgment granted for defendant on retaliatory hostile work environment claim. |
| Whether state-law LGTCA claims are barred for failure to comply with notice requirements. | Notices were provided or substantial compliance occurred; good cause not shown. | Strict failure to comply with § 5-304 notice requirement; no good cause. | Counts IV and V barred; LGTCA notice defects warrant judgment as a matter of law. |
Key Cases Cited
- Rogers v. Bd. of Educ. of Prince George’s Cnty., 859 F. Supp. 2d 742 (D. Md. 2012) (Title VI primary objective/ARRA funds as employment objective question not settled without jury)
- Trageser v. Libbie Rehab. Ctr., Inc., 590 F.2d 87 (4th Cir. 1978) (Title VI primary objective element as part of the claim)
- Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (U.S. 2006) (materially adverse action standard for retaliation)
- James v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 368 F.3d 371 (4th Cir. 2004) (adverse-action standard for retaliation; not require ultimate employment decision)
- Pastrans v. K-Mart Corp., 210 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2000) (pretext standard for retaliation)
- Reynolds v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 69 F.3d 1523 (10th Cir. 1995) (consideration of primary objective in Title VI claims)
- Thom v. Sebelius, 766 F. Supp. 2d 585 (D. Md. 2011) (retaliation hostile environment standards)
- Wang v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 334 F. Supp. 2d 853 (D. Md. 2004) (standard for hostile work environment demonstrates high bar)
- Hansen v. City of Laurel, 420 Md. 670 (Md. 2011) (strict/substantial compliance in LGTCA notice)
- Faulk v. Ewing, 371 Md. 284 (Md. 2002) (substantial compliance where close relationship between notify and notified entities)
- Moore v. Norouzi, 371 Md. 154 (Md. 2002) (substantial compliance requires some effort and close relationship)
- Grubbs v. Prince George’s County, 267 Md. 318 (Md. 1972) (purpose of notice to permit investigation)